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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C. (collectively "Appellees" 
or "Harrison") agree with Appellant Kim Dahl ("Appellant" or "Dahl") that this Court 
has jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I (Presented by Appellant). Whether the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied Ms. Dahl's motion to extend the deadline for designation of expert 
witnesses and for the submission of initial expert witness reports and whether the trial 
court erred by striking Ms. DahPs expert witness reports without leave to amend, even 
though trial had not been set. 
Appellees' Response: Appellees do not dispute Appellant's definition of the 
issue or preservation, but do dispute the implication in the "Standard of Review" 
subsection wherein Appellant implies that a trial court may only have denied Appellant's 
motion to extend expert discovery upon a finding of "willfulness, bad faith ... fault, or 
persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." (Appellant's Br. at 3.) This 
dispute is discussed in detail infra in Argument § I. 
Issue II (Presented by Appellant). Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Ms. Dahl's Motion to Extend Factual Discovery which was filed almost eighteen 
months prior to trial and a full year before the pretrial conference in which a trial date 
was calendared. 
1 
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Appellees' Response: Appellees do not dispute Appellant's definition of the 
issue, standard of review, or preservation for Issue II. 
Issue IIII (Presented by Appellant)., Whether the trial court improperly awarded 
attorney fees as a sanction against Ms. Dahl for filing a motion to extend the deadline for 
the designation of experts and for the submission of initial expert reports. 
Appellees' Response: Appellees do not dispute Appellant's definition of the 
issue, or preservation. The standard of review apparently unintentionally omits a few 
important words, making that section confusing. To be clear, whether a litigant is 
entitled to attorney's fees under a particular statute is reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, ^  8, 221 P.3d 845. Gallegos v. Lloyd, 
2008 UT App 40,115, 178 P.3d 922 ("We defer to the trial court's factual finding of bad 
faith unless it is clearly erroneous."). Appellees agree that to the extent the trial court 
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to its equitable powers, the appropriate standard for 
reviewing equitable awards of attorney fees is abuse of discretion. Fisher, 2009 UT App 
305,^8. 
Issue IV (Additional Issue Presented by Appellees). Whether, even if there was 
error by the trial court, the error was harmless, or the judgment should be affirmed on 
other grounds. 
Standard of Review: "Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." H. U.F. v. W.P. W., 2009 UT 10, ^  44, 203 P.3d 943. Additionally, an 
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
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ground or theory apparent on the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, fflf 10-13, 52 P.3d 
1158. 
Supporting Authority: H. U.F. v. W.P. W.9 2009 UT 10,144, 203 P.3d 943; Bailey 
v. tfqyfey, 2002 UT 58, ffl[ 10-13, 52 P.3d 1158. 
Statement of Preservation: Because an error may always be deemed harmless by 
the appellate court, and because an appellate court may always affirm the trial court's 
judgment on alternative grounds, preservation is not applicable. See H. U.F., 2009 UT 10, 
144; Bailey, 2002 UT 58,110 ("It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not 
urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court."). 
i 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. SUMMARY OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS 
A. The Underlying Divorce Action 
This is a legal malpractice action involving Dahl, the client and the plaintiff, and 
Harrison, the attorney and defendant. Dahl retained Harrison to represent her in a 
divorce proceeding, Dahl v. Dahl, Civil No. 064402232, pending before the Utah Fourth 
District Court, Provo Division (the "Underlying Divorce Action"). Dahl's husband had 
made very serious allegations of child abuse and other outrageous conduct against her, 
and prior to her being served with the divorce petition, Dahl's husband had succeeded in 
obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining order (the "ex parte TRO") enjoining her 
from contact with their children and setting a hearing on the ex parte TRO for November 
2, 2006, a week after its entry. 
Upon being served with the divorce paperwork, Dahl retained Harrison, and 
during the initial interviews, Dahl admitted to striking the children when they "deserved 
it" and making comments to the children like, "Pick this stuff up. I am not your damn 
nigger." With this concerning information, Harrison strategized about how to best 
protect Dahl's rights. Harrison advised Dahl that a continuance of the November 2, 2006 
hearing would be best so that Dahl could enroll in parenting classes and show the divorce 
court that she was turning over a new leaf. With Dahl's informed consent, Harrison 
appeared in court on November 2, 2006, and entered into a stipulation on her behalf (the 
"Stipulation"). The Stipulation, inter alia, allowed Dahl temporary supervised visitation, 
A 
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in part to protect her from additional allegations against her, and expressly preserved all 
rights and arguments for a future hearing. 
Within a few days, new allegations surfaced of more outrageous conduct of Dahl, 
and a fresh motion was filed in the Underlying Divorce Action. By November 9, 2006, 
Dahl and Harrison mutually agreed that their attorney-client relationship was at an end. 
Harrison withdrew and new counsel entered an appearance for Dahl, and the continued 
hearing on the ex parte TRO went forward on November 16, 2006, with Dahl represented 
by the new counsel. A few weeks later, Dahl's replacement counsel withdrew and was 
replaced by Steve S. Christensen ("Christensen"), her current counsel. The Underlying 
Divorce Action continued to go poorly for Dahl. Further allegations were made against 
her and further orders restraining her were entered. Trial in the Underlying Divorce 
Action was held in the fall of 2009, though the case continues to be actively litigated at 
the trial court and appellate level to this day. 
B. The Legal Malpractice Action (This Case) 
On October 11, 2007, Christensen, as counsel for Dahl, filed a legal malpractice 
action against Harrison ("this case" or the "Legal Malpractice Action"), alleging that 
Dahl did not authorize the Stipulation and that the Stipulation the cause of every adverse 
ruling in the Underlying Divorce Action. The parties stipulated to a scheduling order, 
which was proposed by Dahl, to govern discovery in the case. It provided for an April 7, 
2008 fact discovery cutoff, and a May 5, 2008 deadline for Dahl's expert witness 
disclosure. 
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Harrison diligently pursued his discovery during the discovery period. Dahl 
responded to Harrison's written discovery and appeared for deposition, but she did not 
take any discovery of her own. On April 7, 2008, the date of the fact discovery cutoff, 
Dahl served written discovery upon Harrison but made no motion to extend fact 
discovery at that time. Five weeks after fact discovery had expired, and in the face of a 
motion for summary judgment filed by Harrison, Dahl filed a motion to extend discovery. 
By this time, DahPs expert disclosure deadline had also passed with no disclosure or 
report produced. The trial court denied the DahPs motion to extend fact discovery but 
granted Dahl an extension until September 8, 2008, to disclose experts. 
On September 8, 2008, Dahl made an expert disclosure that was grossly deficient, 
providing no real information about the opinions of the experts or the bases for any 
opinions. Harrison moved to strike the disclosure, and the trial court granted the motion 
after hearing on December 16, 2008, finding that Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) provided an 
automatic exclusion of the deficient reports, and Dahl had not met the good cause or 
harmlessness exceptions of Rule 37(f). Less than six weeks after the hearing granting the 
motion to strike, Dahl filed a "Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial." This motion 
presented no new evidence or argument. It addressed the same issues just ruled upon by 
the trial court on December 16, 2008; indeed, most of DahPs brief was a "cut and paste 
job"—i.e., a verbatim restatement of generic arguments from her previous memorandum 
in opposition to the motion to strike and her prior memorandum supporting continuance 
of the discovery deadlines. The trial court denied the motion and found it to be frivolous 
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and in bad faith. Harrison was awarded attorneys' fees and costs incurred in preparing 
the response. 
Ultimately, this case went to the first phase of a bifurcated bench trial in October 
of 2009. The trial court found in favor of Harrison on liability, making the second phase 
of the trial, damages, unnecessary. In addition to finding the absence of expert testimony 
to be fatal to Dahl's claims, the trial court also found, inter alia, that Dahl had failed to 
produce any factual evidence of causation whatsoever on any of her claims. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Dahl filed her complaint in this matter on October 11, 2007. 
2. At the outset of the case, Dahl proposed a scheduling order, to which 
Harrison agreed. It was entered as a stipulated scheduling order by the trial court. (R. 
141-44.) 
3. It provided for an April 7, 2008 fact discovery cutoff, and a May 5, 2008 
deadline for Dahl's expert witness disclosure. (Id.) 
4. On November 20, 2007, Harrison moved to disqualify Christensen and his 
firm from representing Dahl in this case, primarily due to the fact that Christensen5 s 
representation of Dahl in the Underlying Divorce Action made him a material witness for 
trial in the Legal Malpractice Action. No stay of the case was requested by either party 
pending the outcome of the motion to disqualify. 
5. Harrison diligently pursued his discovery as the motion to disqualify was 
pending, serving written discovery requests and taking Dahl's deposition. Dahl 
7 
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responded to Harrison's written discovery and appeared for deposition, but she did not 
take any discovery of her own. 
6. On April 7,2008, the date of the fact discovery cutoff, Dahl served written 
discovery upon Harrison but made no motion to extend fact discovery at that time. 
7. On April 25, 2008, Harrison filed for summary judgment. 
8. Five weeks after fact discovery had expired, and in the face of the motion 
for summary judgment filed by Harrison, Dahl filed a motion to extend discovery. (R. 
392-95.) By this time, Dahl's expert disclosure date had also passed without any 
disclosure. The trial court denied the motion as to fact discovery but granted Dahl until 
September 8, 2008 to disclose experts. (Transcript of August 7, 2008 Hearing 36:21 -
37:10.) The trial court also granted Harrison's motion for a protective order concerning 
the written discovery requests served on the last day of the discovery period, finding that 
they were not timely served. (Id. 23:5-18, 31:6-22; see also R. 609-610 (trial court's 
written order on discovery motions heard August 7, 2008.) 
9. On September 8, 2008, Dahl made an expert disclosure that was grossly 
deficient, providing no real information about the opinions of the experts or the bases for 
any opinions. (R. 578-82.) 
10. Specifically, Dahl's "Expert Witness Reports" included the following 
names (along with addresses and telephone numbers): Martin Olsen, Clark Nielsen, John 
Brough, Mohammad Alsolaimaui, M.D., Lisa Stout, M.D., and Alan Jeffery, M.D. (Id.) 
11. With regard to Martin Olsen, Dahl stated: 
Q 
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a. The witness will testify as to the standard of care owed 
to a client by an attorney engaged in private family law 
practice. 
b. The witness is expected to give an opinion that 
Plaintiff was damaged, the causation of the damages, 
and the extent of the damages in this case. He will also 
testify that the Defendant failed to meet its 
professional duty of care. He may offer rebuttal 
testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
c. The witness' opinions will be based upon a review of 
all information obtained through discovery, the 
testimony of the parties, and his knowledge of the 
accepted standards of care among private practitioners 
of family law in the state of Utah. 
d. The witness is an attorney who has engaged in the 
private practice of family law in the state of Utah for 
seventeen (17) years. 
e. The witness will charge $225.00 an hour for his study 
and $225.00 an hour for his testimony. 
f. Any deposition given by the witness will be produced 
if not included on his c.v. 
(Id) 
12. In the same Expert Witness Report, Dahl used exactly the same words to 
describe Clark Nielsen's expert testimony, except that he had practiced for 32 years. No 
additional information was included for either Mr. Olsen or Mr. Nielsen. (Id.) 
13. In the same Expert Witness Report, Dahl listed no other experts who would 
testify regarding (1) the appropriate standard of care owed to a client by an attorney 
engaged in private family law practice, (2) causation, and (3) damages. (Id.) 
14. Harrison moved to strike the disclosure as non-compliant with Rule 26, and 
Dahl opposed the motion, requesting more time to prepare complete reports. (See, e.g., 
r\ 
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R. 600-607; Transcript of December 16, 2008 Hearing 18:11-13.) The trial court 
specifically addressed DahPs request for more time and rejected it in no uncertain terms. 
(Transcript of December 16, 2008 Hearing 29:23 - 31:6.) At the end of rejecting Dahl's 
request for more time, the trial court stated: 
I find that there is a willful failure on the plaintiff to carry this case forward 
and to obey the orders of the court with the court having given plaintiff 
more time over the objection of the defendant. 
{Id. 31:13-16.) 
15. Less than six weeks after the hearing granting the motion to strike and 
rejecting DahPs request for more time, Dahl filed a "Motion to Allow Expert Testimony 
at Trial." (R. 961-62.) This motion addressed the same issues just ruled upon by the trial 
court on December 16, 2008; indeed, most of Dahl's brief was a "cut and paste job"— 
i.e., a verbatim restatement of generic arguments from her previous memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to strike and her prior memorandum supporting continuance of 
the discovery deadlines. {Compare R. 980-82 with R. 600-01 and R. 408-09.) 
16. At a March 12, 2009 hearing on the Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at 
Trial, the trial court ruled from the bench., denying the motion and finding that Dahl's 
motion was essentially a motion to reconsider the prior ruling on the motion to strike. 
The trial court additionally found (1) that Dahl had cited no grounds which justified 
reconsideration of the court's prior ruling on the motion to strike, (2) that there was no 
reason to grant her more time to disclose expert witnesses, and (3) that, under Rule 37 
and Dahl's failure to properly disclose her expert witnesses, there was no reason to allow 
her to introduce expert testimony at trial. (Transcript of March 12, 2009 Hearing 37:4-
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39:4.) Finally, the trial court found that Dahl's motion was frivolous, and expressly 
adopted the reasoning contained in Harrison's brief that the motion was meritless and 
filed in bad faith. (Id. 38:25 - 39:4.) It awarded attorney's fees to Harrison. (Id. 38:17 -
39:4.) The trial court signed the proposed findings, conclusions and order denying 
Dahl's Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial on April 14, 2009. (R. 
1053-57.) 
17. Pursuant to the trial court's orders, trial went forward on October 26-27, 
2009, without any expert testimony from Dahl's proposed expert witnesses regarding the 
standard of care, causation, and damages. 
18. After the bench trial of this case, the trial court made detailed factual 
findings in a Memorandum Decision dated January 6, 2010. (R. 1436-68.) 
19. Therein, the trial court made a detailed assessment of credibility, stating 
that "the testimony of the defendants' witnesses is generally more credible, consistent, 
and trustworthy" and offering detailed reasons for the assessment. (R. 1464.) 
20. Dahl did not object to those findings of fact or the assessment of credibility, 
nor does her appeal challenge the trial court's ruling on these bases.1 
21. Based upon the Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision dated January 
6, 2010, as well as all evidence presented at trial of the case on October 26-27, 2009, the 
trial court entered Conclusions of Law. (R. 1713-18.) 
1
 Because Dahl does not challenge the facts and credibility assessment on appeal, 
they are conclusively established for the purposes of this appeal. See Howard v. Howard, 
601 P.2d 931, 935 (Utah 1979) (absent valid objection to findings of fact by trial court, 
those findings of fact are deemed conclusive on appeal). 
11 
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22. The trial court concluded that Dahl had failed on the elements of breach and 
causation for all of her claims for relief. Specifically, the trial court found that the failure 
of Dahl to provide expert testimony was fatal to each of her claims. (R. 1713-16, ^  6, 
14, 23 (emphasis added).) 
23. Independently, the trial court also concluded that Dahl's claims failed 
factually because (1) "she failed to present any evidence that she would have benefited 
but for the Stipulation" and (2) "she failed to present any evidence that any injury she 
suffered was the foreseeable result of the Stipulation." (R. 1713-16, fflf 7-8, 15-16, 24-25 
(emphasis added).) 
24. The Conclusions of Law were drafted by counsel for Harrison. Prior to 
their entry, Dahl made a series of objections, which the trial court considered prior to 
entry of the Conclusions of Law. (R. 1487-90.) Dahl never objected to paragraphs 7-8, 
15-16, 24-25 on the basis she felt she had produced such evidence at trial. {See id.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Trial courts have broad discretion to manage their cases, including 
deadlines in pretrial scheduling orders. Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 
UT App 257, f 11, 241 P.3d 375. Dahl argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
declining to extend the expert discovery deadlines at her request and over Harrison's 
objections a second time so as to allow her to produce an expert report that complied with 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26. In do doing, she relies heavily on Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 
2010 UT App 171, 235 P.3d 791, and she reads Welsh so broadly that, if her 
interpretation was adopted, it would effectively strip the trial court of most of its case 
management discretion. To the contrary, the Welsh court recognized the facts of that case 
as unique, expressly distinguishing it from "others of this type"—i.e., from the typical 
case-management discretionary ruling by a trial court. Welsh had the following facts not 
present in this case (1) a change of counsel within days of the expert discovery deadline; 
(2) a motion for enlargement of time filed before the expert discovery deadline; (3) 
obstruction of discovery by the opposing party; (4) no claim of prejudice by the opposing 
party; and (5) a strange docket entry stating that a motion for extension of time was 
granted, which was relied upon. No such facts are present here. Dahl had the 
opportunity to disclose experts properly and in a timely manner and had no just cause for 
the failure. Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion not to extend the expert 
disclosure deadline further. The trial court properly found that the plain language of Rule 
37(f) provided for their automatic exclusion of DahPs deficient expert reports, and Dahl 
had not shown harmlessness or good cause for her failure to comply with Rule 26. 
n 
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Issue I I Akin to Issue I, the trial court was within its broad discretion to refuse to 
extend the fact discovery period. DahPs motion for an extension of fact discovery was 
filed five weeks after the close of fact discovery under the then-operative case 
management order, and Harrison had already filed a motion for summary judgment. The 
deadlines in the then-operative case management order were proposed by Dahl, and she 
did literally no discovery in the case during the discovery period. She served written 
discovery on the last day of the fact discovery period, which is not timely. Accordingly, 
the trial court was within its discretion not to extend the fact discovery deadline and grant 
Harrison's motion for a protective order on the untimely written discovery. 
Issue III. DahPs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial was an abuse of the 
trial process. It was a rehashing of a precise issue that was decided less than six weeks 
prior, and not only that, in deciding the issue against Dahl earlier, the trial court had 
based the ruling in part on a finding that Dahl and her counsel had willfully failed to obey 
orders of the Court concerning expert disclosure. The Motion to Allow Expert 
Testimony at Trial was needless and unnecessary, wasteful of judicial resources, and it 
had no good-faith basis. The trial court was within its powers, both equitable and 
statutory, to award Harrison costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending against the 
motion. See Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UTApp 109, ffif 33-40, 46 P.3d 753 (affirming 
sanction of attorneys' fees for frivolous refilling of motion for continuance that had been 
denied 17 days earlier). Moreover, Dahl failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding of frivolousness and bad faith, and as a result, she cannot challenge it. 
See id. 
1/1 
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Issue IV. Harrison submits that it is not even a close case that the trial court was 
within its broad discretion to enter the orders that are the subject of Issues I-III. 
However, even to the extent that there was some error, the error was harmless. Even if 
Dahl had an expert at trial, that expert could not create facts or evidence. In complex 
cases, there is a knowledge gap between fact and conclusion for laypeople. An expert 
only assists the trier of fact in bridging that gap, helping the trier of fact come to a 
conclusion supported by the factual evidence. The trial court concluded, independent of 
the failure to provide expert testimony, that DahPs claims also failed because of a lack of 
any evidence on causation. Because Dahl failed to present any evidence on causation, 
whether she had an expert at trial would not have yielded a different conclusion at the end 
of the trial. There was no factual evidence on the other side of the bridge. Likewise, 
because the only relevant information that Harrison possessed in this case was on the 
issues of duty and breach, further fact discovery would not have yielded evidence on 
causation. 
1 ^ 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING DAHL'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS AND 
DENYING DAHL'S REQUEST TO EXTEND THE EXPERT 
DISCOVERY DEADLINE. 
A. The Trial Court Was Under No Obligation to Grant Dahl Additional 
Time for Expert Disclosures for a Second Time. 
It is axiomatic that trial courts are vested with broad case-management discretion, 
and cases finding abuse of that discretion are unusual. See Golden Meadows Properties, 
LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, \ 11, 241 P.3d 375 (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by striking untimely affidavits). Case management orders "are necessary to 
expedite the flow of cases through the court system and should not be lightly 
disregarded.55 Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) (affirming refusal to 
consider untimely expert affidavit because it was untimely). This appeal presents plain-
vanilla case-management rulings by the trial court that are precisely the sort that are 
within the trial court's broad discretion. 
In this case, the first expert discovery deadline, which was initially proposed by 
Dahl and stipulated to by Harrison, came and went without Dahl making an expert 
disclosure or moving to extend the expert disclosure deadlines. After that deadline had 
passed, Dahl moved for an extension of the discovery deadlines. In her brief filed June 
11, 2008, she argued to the trial court that "[l]egal malpractice is a highly fact sensitive 
issue yielding complex issues of duty, beach and causation.55 (R. 519.) Even though 
DahPs motion was untimely, the trial court generously granted Dahl a four-month 
extension of time to produce expert reports. On that new deadline, despite the fact she 
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had acknowledged the complexities of the case in a brief three months earlier, Dahl again 
did not take the expert deadline seriously. She produced bare-bones reports that did not 
comply with Rule 26(a)(3)(B). (See R. 578-82.) DahPs only requests for more time 
came after the disclosure expert deadline. 
Dahl relies heavily on Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, 235 
P.3d 791 and seeks to have this Court broaden Welsh to a degree that would strip away 
most of the trial court's case-management discretion. The Welsh court specifically noted 
how unusual the facts of that case were, and those unusual facts are not present here. 
Specifically: 
• The Welch plaintiff had retained new counsel within four days of the 
expert discovery deadline. Id. \ 4. Actually, a calendar reflects it was 
the day before Thanksgiving, and expert disclosures were due the 
following Monday, though the proximity to Thanksgiving is not 
mentioned in the opinion. Conversely, in this case, Dahl had the same 
counsel throughout the case. 
• The Welch plaintiff moved for an extension of time prior to the expert 
discovery deadline. Id. Here, all of Dahl's requests for extension of 
time were after her expert discovery deadlines had passed. 
• The Welch plaintiff alleged that the defendant had inhibited discovery. 
Id. Here, Dahl makes no allegation that Harrison stood in her way to 
take any discovery she chose consistent with the schedule and procedural 
rules. 
17 
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• The trial court in Welch entered a docket entry stating that the motion for 
extension of time was granted, the clerk telephoned the Welch plaintiffs 
counsel to inform them the motion was granted, and counsel relied upon 
the trial court's representation that the motion was granted. Id. YH 7-8. 
Here, there was no false-positive ruling from the trial court. 
• The Welsh defendant never argued to the trial or appellate court that it 
would be prejudiced if the motion was granted. Id. \ 16. Indeed, it 
specifically admitted at oral atrgument that the case "was not promptly 
moved along by either party." Id. f 13. Here, Harrison did promptly 
move the case along, complying with all deadlines. Harrison argued that 
he would be prejudiced by the further delay, and the trial court agreed 
and specifically found Harrison would be prejudiced if the motion was 
granted. 
Likewise, Dahl's reliance on Boyce v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565 is 
incorrect. In Boyce, the plaintiff had properly disclosed experts, but one of his experts 
had withdrawn unexpectedly after the deadlines and shortly before trial. Id. ^4. The 
Boyce court specifically noted that the plaintiff had not violated any discovery orders, 
id. ^  11, and concluded that the plaintiffs predicament was just one of those 
"unforeseen circumstances" for which discovery orders ought to be flexible. Id. <[ 10. 
Here, there was nothing unforeseen or sympathetic about Dahl's situation. Dahl 
specifically recognized the complexities of this case months before the deadline, (R. 
1 O 
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519), yet she did nothing to take the expert disclosure rules seriously. The trial court 
was within its discretion to refuse to reward her for it. 
Accordingly, this case is nothing like Welch or Boyce. This is a case where 
Dahl was dilatory at best while Harrison did nothing to stand in her way beyond 
requesting compliance with discovery rules and orders of court. This case is much 
more analogous to Arnold v. Curtis, where the Utah Supreme Court found that the 
trial court was within its discretion to refuse to consider an expert affidavit "filed in 
derogation of the scheduling order/9 Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1310. Like Arnold, the trial 
court in this case was well within its broad discretion to deny Dahl a second extension 
of the expert discovery deadlines. 
B. Dahl's Expert Reports Did Not Comply With Rule 26 and Were 
Properly Stricken. 
1. The Expert Reports Were Grossly Deficient. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) governs the disclosure of expert testimony in civil cases. 
With respect to experts retained specifically for a given matter, which is the case here, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) requires a written report also be disclosed, and it outlines 
what that report must contain: 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected 
to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by 
the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for 
the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
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The purpose of an expert report is to allow the opposing party sufficient 
information about the expert's opinion such that the opposing party may adequately 
prepare for trial. Jacobsen v. DeseretBook Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002). The 
Advisory Notes to Rule 26 indicate that the purpose of the expert report is to "serve in 
lieu of responses to standard interrogatories." Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes. The 
Rule 26 Advisory Notes go on to state: 
The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report, 
regardless whether the expert or the party prepares or signs it. For this 
reason, the committee believes the expert should prepare and sign the report 
whenever possible and should alwatys review and approve the report. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In Jacobsen, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed similarly inconclusive 
and incomplete expert reports to those at issue here, and it reversed the district court's 
refusal to strike them, stating in part: 
"[Expert] reports are intended not only to identify the expert witness, but 
also to set forth the substance of the direct examination. Such disclosure is 
necessary to allow the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
for effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony 
from other witnesses." 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Jacobsen court went on to state 
that, "[i]f the experts are allowed to testify on the basis of their incomplete reports, [the 
plaintiff] will be prejudiced. Absent more complete disclosure by the experts, [the 
plaintiffs] prejudice cannot be cured." Id. at 954. See also Bowie Mem'lHosp. v. 
Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) ("[T]he expert must explain the basis of his 
statements to link his conclusions to the facts."). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Here, DahPs expert "reports" were so deficient that they realistically amounted to 
no disclosure at all. She merely gave names and extremely vague and generalized topics 
upon which the expert may opine. She cited nothing that any expert actually reviewed to 
form the basis of his or her opinion; instead, Dahl merely stated that the expert's opinion 
"will be based" on essentially everything in the case. As a corollary, the "reports" failed 
to state any link between fact and conclusion. Cf Bowie Mem'lHosp., 79 S.W.3d at 52 
(expert must identify link between fact and conclusion in report). The "reports" also 
failed to state qualifications of any of the experts with any meaningful specificity. This is 
far from stating a response to the standard expert interrogatories that a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) 
report is intended to replace. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes. 
In short, nothing in the expert "reports" was even remotely informative of 
opinions of an "expert," bases of any opinion, or qualifications of an "expert" to render 
any such opinion. Dahl was required to disclose a presently-held opinion of an expert 
with sufficient detail to substitute for responding to standard interrogatories, not one is 
vague, void of substance, nor one that is hypothetical in that it may arise after a future 
review of relevant materials. Thus, the trial court properly found that the "reports" did 
not comply with Rule 26(a)(3)(B). 
2. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Enforcing the Plain 
Language of Rule 37(f) and Refusing to Relieve Dahl of the 
Consequences of Her Non-Compliant Disclosures. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the trial court did not impose a sanction 
upon Dahl in striking her expert reports and not allowing her to present expert testimony 
at trial. The issue before the trial court was exclusion under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). Rule 
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37(f) is self-executing. Because the trial court ruled that Dahl did not comply with Rule 
26(a)(3)(B), the trial court ruled that those reports were automatically excluded pursuant 
to Rule 37(f). It did not, as Dahl argues, "choose an inappropriate sanction.'5 By 
operation of Rule 37(f), the trial court had no choice. 
Rule 37(f) is crystal clear that improper disclosures automatically lead to 
exclusion, and the burden is on the improperly-disclosing party to show harmlessness or 
good cause to escape exclusion. The trial court specifically ruled that Dahl had shown 
neither, and thus she was not saved from Rule 37(f)'s automatic exclusion. The trial 
court was well within its broad discretion to determine that Dahl had not shown the 
required harmlessness or good cause; indeed, Dahl does not marshal any evidence to 
suggest that she made such a showing, nor does she argue that the trial court should have 
found her excepted from Rule 37(f). See Rohan, 2002 UT App 109, If 35 (party 
challenging trial court's finding must marshal evidence supporting a finding). 
Additionally, DahP.s heavy reliance on Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1980) is misplaced for at least three reasons. First, Dugan was decided before the 1999 
overhaul to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which added the self-executing exclusion 
of Rule 37(f) that is at issue here. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes (discussing 
interplay of Rules 26 and 37 in the then-new rules); Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1309-10 
(specifically distinguishing Dugan on the basis that it was decided under old civil 
procedure rules). Under the current Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unlike in the 1970s 
when Dugan was first filed, exclusion is automatic and the burden is on the improperly-
disclosing party to show harmlessness or good cause. Dugan goes through no 
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harmlessness or good cause analysis because that rule did not exist. Second, the Dugan 
court's overarching concern was that the trial court's pretrial order, made 11 months 
before trial, was not reduced to writing, Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1244-45, a situation not 
present here. Third, Dugan did not deal with improperly-disclosed expert reports but the 
failure to produce a pretrial expert witness list 15 days before trial. Dugan did not 
discuss disclosures of expert opinions, nor expert discovery at all. See id. 
Moreover, while no finding of willfulness or bad faith is required under Rule 
37(f), the trial court did find that Dahl had willfully disobeyed orders of the court with 
respect to expert disclosures. (Statement of Material Facts, supra, f 14 (citing Transcript 
of December 16, 2008 Hearing 31:13-16).) Dahl has failed to marshal any evidence to 
suggest otherwise. Simply put, Dahl gave the trial court no reason to relieve her from 
Rule 37(f)'s automatic exclusion, and the trial court was not required to do so. Actually, 
it would have been abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow expert testimony at trial 
without the clear prerequisite of a Rule 26-compliant report or a finding of haimlessness 
or good cause as to why one was not produced. See Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 953. 
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Allow 
Expert Testimony At Trial. 
In connection with her opposition to the trial court's ruling on December 16, 2008, 
concerning her deficient expert reports, Dahl, both in her briefing and at oral argument 
requested more time to prepare complete reports. (See, e.g., R. 600-607; Transcript of 
December 16, 2008 Hearing 18:11-13.) The trial court specifically addressed Dahl's 
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request for more time and rejected it. (Transcript of December 16, 2008 Hearing 29:23 -
31:6.) At the end of rejecting Dahl's request for more time, the trial court stated: 
I find that there is a willful failure on the plaintiff to carry this case forward 
and to obey the orders of the court with the court having given plaintiff 
more time over the objection of the defendant. 
(Transcript of December 16, 2008 Hearing 31:13-16.) 
Less than six weeks after the trial court so sharply rejected her request for more 
time to disclose experts, Dahl filed a "Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial." 
That motion cited nothing new—no new evidence, argument, or anything else—that 
had come up since December 16, 2008. Notably, much of the text of her 
memorandum was generic and was copied and pasted verbatim from her prior 
motions requesting more discovery. Dahl was just asking for more time, again, and 
citing no supportable basis, again. (See R. 961-62, 980-83.) 
For the same reasons as the trial court was within its discretion to refuse to 
relieve Dahl from Rule 37(f)'s automatic exclusion concerning her incomplete expert 
reports and untimely request for extension, the trial court was within its discretion to 
deny the same requested relief when it was presented less than six weeks later. 
2
 The trial court found the Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial frivolous and 
Dahl was sanctioned. She appeals the sanction as well, which is discussed infra at 
Argument, Section III. 
O/ l 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DAHL'S MOTION TO EXTEND FACT DISCOVERY NOR 
IN GRANTING HARRISON'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER. 
A. The Trial Court was Within its Discretion to Deny an Extension of Fact 
Discovery. 
The trial court's refusal to extend fact discovery is another plain-vanilla 
discretionary ruling that it was clearly permitted to make. The deadline had passed by 
five weeks by the time Dahl filed her motion to extend it, and she had taken no discovery 
during the discovery period. As she did at the trial court, DahFs appellate brief cites only 
generic authority that "discovery is broad" and is intended to "elicit facts" and the like in 
support of her assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her untimely 
motion to extend fact discovery. She cites no authority, and Harrison is aware of none, 
stating that a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies more time for discovery for a 
dilatory party that files an untimely motion. 
Dahl also advances the argument that was rejected by the trial court that 
Harrison's motion to disqualify her counsel affected her ability to take discovery. It did 
not. She could have initiated discovery while the motion was pending. Harrison did. 
She chose not to. She could have requested a stay pending the determination of the 
motion. She could have initiated discovery in the two months between February 6, 2008, 
when the motion to disqualify was resolved by stipulation, {see R. 152), and April 7, 
2008, the fact discovery cutoff. She could have moved for an extension of discovery 
during those two months. She did none of these things, and the trial court properly 
os 
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refused to reward her for it. Neither the motion to disqualify, nor anything else, 
warranted extension of the fact discovery period. 
B. The Trial Court was Within its Discretion to Grant Harrison's Motion 
for a Protective Order. 
The first time Dahl attempted any discovery in this case was when she served 
written discovery requests on the date of the fact discovery cutoff. While the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are silent on whether such discovery is timely, courts from other 
jurisdictions have repeatedly held that they are untimely because they must have been 
served so that responses were due before discovery is complete. See Erbe Elektromedizin 
GmbHv. Canady, 2006 WL 3387176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. November 21, 2006) (finding that 
"all discovery initiatives shall be served within sufficient time to allow responses to be 
completed prior to the close of discovery. Based upon the same, I find Plaintiffs' 
discovery initiatives served on the last day of discovery to be untimely, such that 
Defendants are not required to respond to the same."); Chevola v. Cellco Partnership, 
2007 WL 3379779, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. November 14, 2007) ("[T]he completion date for 
discovery means just that—all discovery must be completed by that date. Hence, 
interrogatories, as an example, must be served more than thirty days prior to the 
completion date to permit the opposing party to respond before the discovery 
deadline."); Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors Co., LLC, 2007 WL 
4409781, at *1 (M.D. Fla. January 16, 2007) (same); Brodeur v. McNamee, 2005 WL 
1774033, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2005) (same); Eplingv. UCB Films, Inc., 2001 WL 
584355 (D. Kan. April 2, 2001) (same). 
0 £ 
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Harrison submits that this issue comes up so frequently in civil litigation that, as a 
matter of policy, this Court should include in a published opinion for this case that the 
trial court was affirmatively correct in determining that discovery requests are untimely 
unless served so that responses were due before discovery is complete. The completion 
of fact discovery is the most important discovery deadline. It is critical to other deadlines 
in the case. Experts rely on facts elicited in fact discovery, which is supposed to be a 
"closed universe" after the fact discovery deadline. Rule 26 's presumptive case 
management deadline for expert disclosures is 30 days after the close of fact discovery. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3)(C). Serving discovery requests on the last day of fact 
discovery means that the responses (which presumably contain new facts) would be due 
contemporaneously with expert reports, inviting unnecessary delay and burden upon the 
litigants, their experts, and the trial courts. Clear and binding authority in this regard 
would benefit the State of Utah's litigants and judiciary. 
Regardless of whether this Court expressly ratifies the trial court's decision, the 
trial court was within its discretion to interpret the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
conformity with the above-cited authorities from other jurisdictions and grant Harrison's 
motion for a protective order. Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the protective order would only reward dilatory litigants and counsel, and it 
would give obstreperous litigants and counsel a way to delay trial court proceedings by 
waiting to serve discovery requests until the final day of fact discovery so that expert 
discovery would inevitably be disrupted. Obviously, this is contrary to the policy and 
goals of this State. 
07 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SANCTIONING DAHL FOR 
FILING A FRIVOLOUS MOTION. 
As stated above in Argument Section LB.3, Dahl specifically requested more time 
for preparation of expert reports, and the trial court specifically and unequivocally 
rejected that request on December 16, 2008. In do doing, the trial court ruled that Dahl 
had willfiilly failed to obey orders of the Court. Then, Dahl requested the same relief less 
than six weeks later, citing no new fact or law.3 The trial court found that it was in bad 
faith and awarded costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending the motion to Harrison. 
A. Dahl's Challenge to the Trial Court's Bad Faith Finding Fails Because 
She Has not Marshaled the Evidence. 
In challenging a trial court's findings of bad faith, a party "is required to marshal 
the evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence supporting the trial court's 
ruling." Rohan, 2002 UT App 109, ^ f 35. Here, Dahl merely disagrees with the trial 
court and argues that her motion was in good faith. She has made no attempt to comply 
with the marshalling requirement and thus this Court should conclude that the record 
supports the finding of bad faith. See id. 
B. The Trial Court Was Within its Discretion to Sanction Dahl and 
Christensen Under its Inherent Powers. 
Courts of general jurisdiction, like the district court here, possess "inherent 
equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when [... ] appropriate in the interest 
of justice and equity." Id. % 34 (affirming sanction of attorneys' fees for frivolous 
3
 In a footnote of her brief, Dahl states for the first time on appeal that the purpose 
of the motion was to preserve her right to appeal. Her right was already preserved, and 
she never stated preservation as a basis for the motion to the trial court in response to 
Harrison's motion for sanctions. 
?.R 
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refilling of motion for continuance that had been denied 17 days earlier). This inherent 
power includes the "power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their 
conduct thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases through the court." 
Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993). Akin to Rohan where a 
sanction was affirmed when a repeat motion was filed within weeks, the trial court was 
within its discretion to determine that, in the interest of justice and equity, Harrison 
should be awarded costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with responding to 
this repeat motion, especially since the trial court had already found Dahl and Christensen 
to have willfully failed to obey orders of the court. The trial court found bad faith on 
behalf of Dahl and Christensen in connection with the motion—a finding that is clearly 
supported by the record, (see Statement of Material Facts, supra, ^f 9-16), and Dahl 
cannot contest that finding due to her failure to meet the marshalling requirement. See 
Rohan, 2002 UT App 109, f 35. 
C. The Trial Court's Alternative Basis for Sanctioning Plaintiff—Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-5-825—Was not Clearly Erroneous. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 was also a proper alternative basis for an award of 
attorneys' fees. While Dahl is correct that that statute uses the word "action,55 the court in 
Rohan affirmed an attorneys5 fees award under the same statute, specifically and 
separately under the statute. Id ffif 38-40 ("We agree with the trial court that Rohan's 
renewed motion ... was frivolous and without basis in law or fact. Thus, the first 
requirement of [the bad faith statute] was met.55). Thus, Rohan interprets Utah Code Ann. 
9Q 
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§ 78B-5-825 to be broader than just the merits of the ultimate claims and defenses. See 
id. 
Dahl also argues that an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 that 
includes motions would subsume Utah R. Civ. P. 11. Dahl is wrong. Rule 11 applies to 
counsel, not parties. The purpose of the statute is to have a statutory basis to sanction 
parties for bad faith and meritless positions. The statute properly supplements Rule 11; 
together, they allow a trial court to sanction either litigants, their counsel, or both for 
abuses of the litigation process. They are important tools for the trial courts to police 
both counsel and litigants. 
For those reasons, the trial court was correct in using Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-
825 as an alternative basis for sanctions. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING SHOULD ALSO BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE DAHL FAILED TO PRESENT ANY FACT AT TRIAL 
THAT COULD SUPPORT A FINDING OF CAUSATION ON ANY OF 
HER CLAIMS. 
Finally, while Harrison submits that it is not even a close case that the trial court 
was within its broad discretion to enter the orders that are the subject of Sections I-III 
above, even to the extent that there was some error, the error was harmless or the 
judgment should be affirmed on an independent ground that Dahl failed to present facts at 
trial to demonstrate causation. 
Obviously, Dahl was required to prove a causal connection between some 
wrongful act by Harrison and an injury she sustained. See, e.g., Shaw Resources Ltd., 
L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 142 P.3d 560, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 
^o 
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(affirming summary judgment on legal malpractice claim in favor of law firm where 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate causation); Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 
1949) ("It is fundamental that the burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the causal 
connection between the injury and the alleged negligence of the defendant.5'). Likewise, 
proximate causation requires proof that the injury was foreseeable. See Steffensen v. 
Smith's Mgrnt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). 
"In legal malpractice actions based on breach of fiduciary duty, clients must show 
that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of professional conduct and had 
not breached fiduciary duties, the client would have benefited." Shaw Resources, 142 
P.3d at 569. In Utah, causation or the connection between fault and damages in legal 
malpractice actions "cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture." Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978) (granting 
directed verdict in favor of law firm in legal malpractice action for the plaintiffs failure 
to show causation). 
For example, in Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of a 
directed verdict in favor of a law firm representing a client in a divorce and custody 
dispute. Id. at 895-97. There, lawyer had failed to effectuate proper service upon the 
opposing party, and the delay in service allowed the opposing party to relocate to Florida 
and establish jurisdiction there. Id. at 895. The Court held that the delay in service did 
not, as a matter of law, cause injury to the plaintiff because there was no evidence that the 
result of the custody proceedings would have been different, nor that legal expenses 
would have been unnecessary, absent the lawyer's conduct. Id. at 897. 
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Here, the same analysis applies. To prove causation, Dahl was required to put 
forward admissible evidence showing that the adverse child-custody orders in the 
Underlying Divorce Action were not actually based upon the divorce court's analysis of 
the best interests of the her children but rather were based upon the Stipulation, and that 
there would have been a different result without the Stipulation. Id. at 895-97. She 
presented no such evidence. Independent of the rulings on expert testimony, the trial 
court specifically found that Dahl had "failed to present any evidence that she would 
have benefited but for the Stipulation" and that "she failed to present any evidence that 
any injury she suffered was the foreseeable result of the Stipulation." (R. 1713-16, ^ 7-
8, 15-16, 24-25 (emphasis added).) Dahl never objected to these findings before the trial 
court and does not object to them in this appeal, and thus she has waived any argument to 
the contrary. See Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 2010 UT App 9, fflf 10-
13, 223 P.3d 1141 (failure to challenge adequacy of findings before trial court constitutes 
waiver of the challenge for the purpose of appeal). 
An expert does not create factual evidence. In complex cases, there is a 
knowledge gap between fact and conclusion for laypeople. An expert only assists the 
trier of fact in bridging that knowledge getp, helping the trier of fact come to a conclusion 
supported by the factual evidence. Because Dahl failed to present any evidence on 
causation, whether she had an expert at trial would not have yielded a different 
conclusion at the end of the trial. There was no factual evidence on the other side of the 
bridge. 
X) 
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Likewise, further fact discovery would not have changed the trial court's rulings 
on causation. The only relevant information that Harrison possessed in this case was on 
the issues of duty and breach. Whether the Stipulation caused any harm was always 
information that was in the control of Dahl or was part of the public record of the 
Underlying Divorce Action. An additional month or year of fact discovery would not 
have elicited any further evidence on causation. 
For those reasons, any error was harmless, or in the alternative, the discovery 
rulings should be upheld on the alternative ground that Dahl failed to put forward any 
facts supporting the element of causation on any of her claim. See H. U.F. v. W.P.W., 
2009 UT 10,144, 203 P.3d 943; Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ffi[ 10-13, 52 P.3d 1158. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Appeal should be dismissed, with costs taxed to Dahl. 
Dated this ffi^niay o f February, 2011. 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LEEBERMAN, PLC 
^^^^^l^nLieberman 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
"Hi Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*• Part V. Depositions and Discovery 
-•RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) 
and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, 
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of 
each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims 
or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the 
party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 
34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent 
of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance 
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may 
be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the 
case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the 
judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after 
the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated 
by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of 
the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A 
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party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably 
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has 
not fully completed the investigation of the case or because the party 
challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another 
party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not 
apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the 
pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making 
proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; 
and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not 
represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under 
subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person 
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702,703, or 705 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is 
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; 
the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
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by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days 
after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the 
evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same 
subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 
days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following 
information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than 
solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the 
party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a 
transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which 
the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need 
arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days 
before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by 
the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to 
the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, 
that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under 
subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other than objections 
under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed 
waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall 
be made in writing, signed and served. 
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(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery 
by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination 
or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or 
things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and 
other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for 
admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the 
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection 
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information 
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information 
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because 
of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly make any claim that the 
source is not reasonably accessible, describing the source, the nature and 
extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and any 
other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On 
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the 
court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows 
good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may 
specify conditions for the discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods 
set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines 
that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or 
is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
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(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the 
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. 
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant 
to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision 
(b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by 
or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that 
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the 
preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue hardship 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In 
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been 
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the 
action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a 
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. 
If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement 
previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a 
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it 
and contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an 
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required 
under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 
days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert 
who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation 
of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a 
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witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other 
means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under 
Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; and 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) 
of this rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained 
under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party 
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and 
opinions from the expert. 
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information 
otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or 
subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the 
claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, 
communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, 
without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other 
parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that 
is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the 
information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party 
must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and 
any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim 
is resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the information to the 
court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party 
disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable 
steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until 
the claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant 
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties 
in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause 
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shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be 
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or 
person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to 
the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under 
subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party may not 
seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred 
as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after 
the first answer is filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience 
of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, 
methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party 
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is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure 
under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a 
response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include 
information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following 
circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals 
disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material 
respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the 
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to 
the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision 
(a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to information contained in the report and 
to information provided through a deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an 
interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if the party 
learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect 
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 
known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the 
action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of 
their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement of the 
action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), 
to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information and to 
develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the 
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall 
attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement 
for disclosures under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when 
disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made; 
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(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery 
should be completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and 
whether discovery should be limited to particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it 
should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert 
such claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their 
agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery 
imposed under these rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis 
for allocating fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiff's counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the 
meeting and in any event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed 
a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery 
plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects 
listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial 
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the 
court or may be deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are 
unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the 
plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery 
order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules 
shall govern any subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery 
plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or 
order under Rule 16(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the 
stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on 
stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order. The 
stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder. 
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(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is 
not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of the 
attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the 
request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not 
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the 
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and 
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, 
or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, 
response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action 
with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the 
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is 
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, 
including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an 
action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person 
within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions 
and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, 
provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such 
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the 
person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and 
provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition 
which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be 
submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
( i) Filing. 
( i ) ( l ) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures 
or requests for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original 
certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery 
have been served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request 
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for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of 
service stating that the response has been served on the other parties and 
the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 
37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the 
response which is at issue. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November 1, 2007; November, 
2008.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE FOR DISCOVERY RULES AMENDMENTS 
Objectives. The 1999 amendments to Rules 16, 26, 30, 32 and 33 comprise 
a new model for discovery and case management in state court cases. The 
objective of the new model is simply to better manage litigation by planning. 
The amendments achieve this simple objective as follows: 
They require the parties and encourage the judge to evaluate the case early 
in the process and to plan appropriate discovery; 
They establish default deadlines and limits to govern those cases in which 
the parties cannot agree to a discovery plan and do not seek a judicial order; 
and 
They require each party to disclose to other parties the names of persons 
with discoverable information supporting that party's claims or defenses, a 
description of documents supporting that party's claims or defenses, a 
computation of damages and the existence of insurance agreements. 
The rule changes are intended to simplify discovery and promote full 
disclosure of discoverable information. The limits and deadlines specified in 
these rules are not intended to fit all cases. Parties should cooperate and 
stipulate to and courts should consider different deadlines and limits 
appropriate for specific cases. The rule changes that implement these 
objectives are as follows: 
Discovery and Scheduling Conference of the Parties. Rule 26(f ) . The 
1999 amendments require the parties to meet and confer about the case as 
soon as practicable after commencement of the action. (The deadline for 
filing the stipulated discovery plan effectively limits the time for the 
conference to within 46 days after the first answer is filed.) To help ensure 
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the case does not stall, the rule imposes on plaintiffs counsel the obligation 
to schedule the meeting and to submit to the court the discovery plan and 
order resulting from the meeting. At the meeting the parties settle what they 
can and develop a discovery plan for any remaining issues. At this point the 
content of the discovery plan is entirely within the control of the parties. The 
rule suggests elements commonly raised in the course of discovery, but 
counsel should tailor the discovery plan to meet the needs of the particular 
case. Within 14 days after the meeting, plaintiff's counsel prepares a 
stipulated discovery plan and order, which is submitted to the court for 
approval. If the parties cannot agree or can only partially agree to a 
stipulated discovery plan, the plaintiff must and any party may move for a 
discovery order. If the court does not order otherwise, the default deadlines 
and limits of the rules govern. Discovery proceeds in the normal course and 
in accordance with the discovery plan after the discovery and scheduling 
conference. The parties are required to meet once, but subsequent 
meetings, as necessary, to amend the discovery plan are not precluded. 
A later-added party is bound by the discovery order but can conduct a 
discovery and scheduling conference to obtain a stipulated amendment to 
the original plan. If the parties will not stipulate to reasonable discovery by a 
later-added party, the court can order appropriate relief upon motion. The 
court should be sensitive to the nature, extent and timing of discovery by a 
later-added party. 
Scheduling and Management Conference with the Court. Rule 
16(b). The 1999 amendments provide that any party can file a motion for a 
discovery order on issues the parties cannot agree upon, and the court will 
rule upon that motion. Any party may seek a scheduling and management 
conference with the court, but, because of large caseloads, the rules permit 
the court to decline the conference. By conducting a scheduling and 
management conference, however, the court has the opportunity early in 
the process to evaluate the case and manage it accordingly, to explore 
mediation and settlement, to resolve disputes over the nature and extent of 
discovery, and to identify issues collateral to the litigation. It is not 
anticipated that judges will manage a case contrary to the stipulation of the 
parties. However, the court's interest in case management is independent of 
that of the parties, and the court needs the discretion independently to 
manage the case, especially when the parties cannot agree. 
The scheduling and management conference is designed to encourage the 
parties and the court to take earlier and better control of the litigation. If 
possible, the trial date should be set at this conference as well as dates for 
all of the necessary pretrial steps and any modifications to the presumptions 
established by the discovery rules. 
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To avoid possible confusion surrounding the multiplicity of objectives of the 
various conferences with the court, the amendments delete the long list of 
objectives found in the former rule, which the committee determined are 
adequately covered under subsection (a). The objectives remain sound. The 
scheduling and management conference is a particular type of conference 
with specified and limited objectives. Any other conference prior to trial is 
properly called a pretrial conference and the objectives are more varied. In 
addition to the objectives in the rule itself, the following objectives may be 
appropriate: 
(1) forming and simplifying issues and eliminating frivolous claims and 
defenses; 
(2) obtaining admissions of fact and stipulations to documents; 
(3) obtaining stipulations or rulings on the admissibility of evidence; 
(4) referring matters to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution; 
(5) adopting special procedures for managing actions that may involve 
complex issues of fact or law, multiple parties, or unusual proof problems; 
and 
(6) the form and substance of a pretrial order. 
Required Initial Disclosures. Rule 26(a) . The 1999 amendments require 
each party to provide to all other parties the names of persons with 
discoverable information supporting that party's claims or defenses, a 
description of documents supporting that party's claims or defenses, a 
computation of any damages it claims and any insurance that may satisfy 
some or all of any judgment. This exchange of information occurs within 14 
days after the discovery and scheduling conference of the parties. A party 
can only disclose that which is known at the time. As further information is 
developed, the party is under a duty to supplement the initial disclosures. If 
a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court 
to prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was 
harmless or there is good cause for the failure. The court may order any 
other sanction it determines to be appropriate and Rule 37(f) provides some 
examples. 
Expert reports. Rule 26(a)(3). Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
an expert's report need not be written and signed by the expert. The report 
may be signed by the witness or the party. In addition to the qualifications 
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of the expert, the report must contain the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for 
each opinion. In effect, the report will serve in lieu of responses to standard 
interrogatories. The committee considered but decided not to adopt the 
federal rule governing expert reports. Both plaintiffs' attorneys and defense 
attorneys reported on the high cost of reports by experts, the growth of non-
practicing experts as a profession, and the need to depose experts 
regardless of a written report. The expert should not be permitted to testify 
at variance with the report, regardless whether the expert or the party 
prepares or signs it. For this reason, the committee believes the expert 
should prepare and sign the report whenever possible and should always 
review and approve the report. For genetics testing in paternity cases, 
compliance with Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 15, Part 5 is sufficient to 
satisfy the expert report requirement unless a party objects and specifically 
requests a report under the rule. 
Exempt cases. Rule 26(a) (2 ) . The scope of the exemption is very limited. 
If a case is exempt, the parties do not need to meet and confer under Rule 
26(f), and they do not need to disclose under Rule 26(a)(1). All other 
discovery provisions apply to exempt cases. All information subject to 
mandatory disclosure in a non-exempt case is subject to discovery using 
traditional methods in an exempt case. The committee did not seek to 
exempt simple cases. The rule amendments benefit simple as well as 
complex litigation. The only exempt cases are those identified in Rule 
26(a)(2). 
Depositions. Rule 30. The party taking the deposition may designate and 
pay for any method of recording the deposition. Any other party may 
designate and pay for an additional method of recording. The rule prohibits 
argumentative and suggestive objections. 
Default Deadlines and Limits. The discovery rules establish presumptive 
deadlines and limits, the purpose of which are to encourage stipulations to 
deadlines and limits suitable to the needs of the particular case. If the 
discovery needs of the parties are not equivalent, the court, in entering a 
discovery order, should consider whether the presumptive deadlines and 
limits are being used by one party to frustrate legitimate discovery. The 
discovery rules establish the following new deadlines and limits, any of which 
can be modified by stipulation of the parties or order of the court: 
Procedure Deadline or Limitation 
Discovery and scheduling conference of 
the parties 
Held as soon as practicable after 
commencement of the action. (The deadline 
for filing the stipulated discovery plan 
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effectively limits the time for the conference 
to within 46 days after the first answer is 
filed.) 
Stipulated discovery plan and order 
Required initial disclosures 
Supplement required initial disclosures 
Amend response to interrogatories, 
request for production or request for 
admission 
Initial disclosures by later added party 
Motion by later added party to amend the 
discovery plan 
Number of depositions oral and written 
Review and modify record of deposition 
Interrogatories 
Fact discovery 
Identify expert witnesses and disclose 
expert reports 
Identify rebuttal expert and disclose 
rebuttal expert reports 
Deposition of expert witness 
Certify that case is ready for trial 
Pretrial disclosure of "will call" and "may 
call" witnesses, deposition testimony, and 
exhibits 
Objections to pretrial disclosures 
Trial 
Submit to court within 14 days after the 
discovery and scheduling conference but in 
no event more than 60 days after the first 
answer is filed. 
Provide within 14 days after the discovery 
and scheduling conference. 
At appropriate intervals. 
Seasonably. 
Provide within 30 days after being served. 
File within a reasonable time after being 
joined. 
Ten per side. 
Within 30 days after notice that record is 
available but only if deponent requested 
opportunity to review record prior to 
completing deposition. 
No more than 25 questions, including 
discrete subparts. 
Begins after the parties conduct their 
discovery and scheduling conference. Closes 
240 days after first appearance by a 
defendant. 
Within 30 days after close of fact 
discovery. 
Within 60 days after disclosure by other 
party of expert identity and report. 
Conduct within 60 days after disclosure of 
the expert's report. 
File immediately upon the close of all 
discovery. 
Provide at least 30 days prior to trial. 
File within 14 days after pretrial 
disclosure. 
Schedule as soon after certificate of 
readiness as is mutually convenient for court 
and parties. 
Code of Judicial Administration. Rules 4-104 and 4-502 are being 
repealed and the provisions of those rules are being integrated into the Rule 
of Civil Procedure. The certificate of readiness for trial required by 4-104 is 
now in URCP_16(b) and the restrictions on filing discovery documents with 
the court are now in Rule 26(1). 
The Supreme Court order approving the amendments directed that the new 
procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
* i Utah Rules of Civil Procedure CRefs & Annos) 
* i Part V. Depositions and Discovery 
-•RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE OR COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY; 
SANCTIONS 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an 
order compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made 
to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a 
deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made 
to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any 
other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. 
The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith 
conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in 
an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
(a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted 
under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a 
designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. The motion must include a certification that the movant 
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party 
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or 
material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral examination, 
the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination 
before applying for an order. 
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(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes 
of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response 
is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery 
is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the 
motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to 
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the 
order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was 
filed without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the 
disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's 
nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified, or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order 
authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the moving party or the attorney or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after 
opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order, 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent 
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the 
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey 
an order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule 
or Rule 35„ unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, 
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the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to 
the failure as are just, including the following: 
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established 
for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party 
obtaining the order; 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in 
evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the 
order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
render judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to 
a physical or mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the 
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under 
Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the 
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party 
requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, 
including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it 
finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or 
(2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party 
failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on 
the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear 
before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories 
submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) 
to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 
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34, after proper service of the request, the court on motion may take any 
action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on motion may 
take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or 
other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a 
prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not 
be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for 
the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on 
motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits the inherent 
power of the court to take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2) if a 
party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a 
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a 
duty. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective January 1, 1987; November 1, 1999; November 1, 
2000; April 1, 2002; November 1, 2007.] 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-825 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-27-56 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
* i Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
*• Part 8. Miscellaneous fRefs & Annos) 
-*§ 78B-5-825. Attorney fees—Award where action or defense in bad 
faith—Exceptions 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before 
the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 3, 5 857, eff. Feb. 7. 2008. 
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176 (W.D.Pa.) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 3387176 (W.D.Pa.)) 
HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. Pennsylvania. 
ERBE ELEKTROMEDIZIN GMBH, Erbe USA, 
Inc., and Conmed Corporation, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Dr. Jerome CANADY and Canady Technology, 
LLC, Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 05-1674. 
Nov. 21, 2006. 
Gabriela I. Coman, Laurence E. Fisher, Philip G. 
Hampton, II, Dickstein Shaprio LLP, Washington, 
DC, Leland P. Schermer, Leland Schermer & Asso-
ciates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John G. Powers, Han-
cock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs. 
Brad R. Newberg, Christopher F. Winters, Newberg 
& Winters, Vienna, VA, Timothy R. Dewitt, Alexan-
dria, VA, Daniel M. Darragh, Mark A. Grace, Cohen 
& Grigsby P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER 
AMBROSE, Chief District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel Re-
sponse to its Discovery Requests, or in the Alterna-
tive, Extend the Discovery Deadline to Permit the 
Response to the Already-Served Requests. (Docket 
No. 98). By way of background, on March 9, 2006, 
counsel, in compliance with this Court's local patent 
rules, filed a Rule 26(f) report with a proposed fact 
discovery completion date of October 27, 2006. 
(Docket No. 25). On October 27, 2006, the last day 
of fact discovery, Plaintiffs propounded discovery 
upon Defendants. Defendants object to this discovery 
arguing that it is untimely and requested a telephone 
conference with this Court. (Docket No. 103). During 
a telephone conference regarding the timeliness of 
said discovery, I granted Plaintiffs leave to file a 
Brief supporting their position. (Docket No. 96). 
Thereafter, I called counsel back and requested that 
Plaintiffs indicate in their Motion a time line of the 
discovery that they had taken in this case. 
I first note that Plaintiffs failed to supply this 
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Court with a time line of the discovery they had taken 
in this case. See, Docket No. 98. Defendants, how-
ever, responded to the same indicating that prior to 
October 27, 2006, Plaintiffs only discovery initiatives 
were served on March 10, 2006. (Docket No. 103, p. 
2). In other words, between March 10, 2006, and the 
last day of discovery, October 27, 2006, Plaintiffs 
propounded no other discovery in this case. Id. 
In support of their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs 
cite to two cases out of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania.— I am not persuaded by the rationale of 
the cases. Further, I find them to be distinguishable 
from the within matter. Specifically, the cases cited 
by Plaintiffs were out of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and not subject to this court's local patent 
rules, whereas the within matter is governed by the 
Local Patent Rules for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania. 
FN1. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are Mines 
v. City of Phil, No. 93-3052, 1994 U.S.Dist. 
LEXIS 9776, at *2 (E.D.Pa. July 18, 1994), 
and Laurenzano v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, 
Inc., No. 00-02621; 2003 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 
13258, at *6-7 (E.D.Pa. July 28, 2003). 
This Court's Local Patent Rules provide a Model 
Scheduling Order, which sets forth the following: 
(10) The parties shall complete fact discovery by, 
all interrogatories, depositions, requests for admis-
sions, and requests for production shall be served 
within sufficient time to allow responses to be 
completed prior to the close of discovery. 
See, United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania Local Patent Rules, Appen-
dix C, f 10 (emphasis added). According to their 
Rule 26(f) Report, counsel used the above^ Model 
Scheduling Order in preparing their Rule 26(f) Re-
port. See, Docket No. 25. Thus, there can be no doubt 
that counsel was aware that "complete" means just 
that-that all discovery initiatives shall be served 
within sufficient time to allow responses to be com-
pleted prior to the close of discovery. Based upon the 
same, I fmd Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives served on 
A N . . * - T m r~* wr 1 
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the last day of discovery to be untimely, such that 
Defendants are not required to respond to the same. 
Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, that if such 
initiatives are determined to be untimely, this Court 
extend the discovery deadline to permit the responses 
to the already served initiatives. (Docket No. 98). I 
decline to grant such relief. According to Defendants, 
the initiatives propounded upon them include 71 
document requests, 8 interrogatories, 243 requests for 
admissions, 9 notices of personal depositions, and a 
Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition listing 62 catego-
ries. (Docket No. 103, p. 2). This is an extensive 
amount of discovery.— Plaintiffs offer no reason for 
why they waited until the last day of discovery to 
serve the same. Moreover, I believe that such exten-
sive initiatives would not be completed within 30 
days. As a result, the discovery period for this case 
would be extended well beyond the time period rea-
sonably contemplated by the local patent rule and this 
Court. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is 
denied. 
FN2. According to Defendants, it comprises 
98% of Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives. 
(Docket No. 103, p. 1). 
*2 THEREFORE, this 21st day of November, 
2006, after careful consideration and for the reasons 
set forth within, it is ordered that Plaintiffs' Motions 
to Compel (Docket No. 98) is denied. 
W.D.Pa.,2006. 
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176 
(W.D.Pa.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 3379779 (M.D.Fla. 
(Cite as: 2007 WL 3379779 (MLD.FIa.)) 
HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Tampa Division. 
Sandra CHEVOLA, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 
Defendant. 
No. 8:06-cv-1312-T-30MAP. 
Nov. 14, 2007. 
James E. Aker, Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & 
Ginsburg, PA, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff. 
Gregory Alan Hearing, Thompson, Sizemore & Gon-
zalez, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant. 
ORDER 
MARK A. PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel (doc. 31). The motion, filed two 
and a half months after the discovery cutoff date, 
asks this Court to compel responses to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories and production of documents in 
response to Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fifth Re-
quest to Produce. This motion is untimely and is 
therefore denied. 
This district follows the rule that the completion 
date for discovery means just that-all discovery must 
be completed by that date. Middle District Discovery 
(2001) at § I.F.I (emphasis in rule). Hence, interroga-
tories, as an example, must be served more than thirty 
days prior to the completion date to permit the oppos-
ing party to respond before the discovery deadline. 
Id. If the parties agree to conduct discovery after the 
Court's discovery deadline, they cannot expect the 
Court to resolve their post-deadline discovery dis-
putes. Id. Moreover, the Court expects the parties to 
address discovery disputes promptly-before the dis-
covery deadline passes or soon thereafter. See Pushko 
v. Klebener. 2007 WL 2671263 (M.D.Fla.2007) 
("Motions to compel must be brought in a timely 
manner."); AB Diversified Enterprises. Inc. v. Global 
Transport Logistics. Inc.. 2007 WL 1362632 *1 
(S.D.Fla.2007) ("[A] motion to compel filed more 
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than two months after the discovery cutoff is clearly 
untimely."); see also Suntrust Bank v. Blue Water 
Fiber. L.P.. 210 F.R.D. 196. 200-201 
(E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing cases from various dis-
tricts citing general principle); Sales v. State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Co.. 632 F.Supp. 435 
(N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed after the 
close of discovery was untimely). 
The Defendant asserts that it timely responded to 
Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (served on May 
24, 2007), her Third Request to Produce (served on 
June 14, 2007), and her Fifth Request to Produce and 
First Set of Interrogatories (both served on June 27, 
2007). See Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Mo-
tion to Compel, doc. 51, at 12. However, the Plaintiff 
made no objection to the discovery responses until 
September 11, 2007-nearly a month and a half after 
the July 27, 2007, discovery cutoff. While the delay 
between September 11, 2007, and the filing of this 
motion on October 15, 2007, is fairly attributable to 
negotiations between the parties and the Defendant's 
request for additional time to consider the Plaintiffs 
arguments, there is no justification for Plaintiffs fail-
ure to make any objection prior to September 11, 
2007. Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (doc. 31) is DE-
NIED. 
DONE and ORDERED. 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Chevola v. Cellco Partnership 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 3379779 
(M.D.Fla.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 1774033 (N.D.N.Y.) 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 1774033 (N.D.N.Y.)) 
HOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. New York. 
Dale R. BRODEUR, Sr., Plaintiff, 
v. 
Sean MCNAMEE, et al , Defendants. 
Dale R. BRODEUR, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
William BRODEUR, Defendant. 
No. 3:02-CV-823 NAM/DEP, 3:02-CV-846 
NAM/DEP. 
July 27, 2005. 
Office of Ronald Cohen, New York, New York, for 
Plaintiffs, Ronald Cohen, of counsel. 
Coughlin, Gerhart Law Firm, Binghamton, New 
York, for Defendant McNamee, Richard B. Long, of 
counsel. 
Office of Terence O'Leary, Walton, New York, for 
All Remaining Defendants, Terence O'Leary, of 
counsel. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
PEEBLES, Magistrate J. 
*1 These separate but related actions spring from 
a business dispute involving members of the Brodeur 
family, as well as certain of their businesses and af-
filiates, which has spawned * extensive litigation in 
both the federal and state courts. The two actions 
now before this court, both of which have been pend-
ing for over three years, have been fiercely litigated, 
presenting discovery disputes at nearly every turn. 
The latest dispute centers around plaintiffs' ser-
vice of requests for admissions shortly before the 
close of discovery and their application for a deter-
mination that by virtue of their failure to serve timely 
responses, certain of the defendants have admitted 
the facts set forth in those requests. Defendants op-
pose plaintiffs' motion, arguing that because they 
were not served more than thirty days prior to the 
discovery deadline imposed under the court's case 
management order, the requests were untimely and, 
as such, no response was required. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On July 29, 2004 I issued a uniform pretrial 
scheduling order in each of these two cases establish-
ing certain deadlines including, inter alia, the re-
quirement that all discovery in the actions be com-
pleted by February 18, 2005.— Civil Action No. 
3:02-CV-846 (NAM/DEP), Dkt. No. 43; Civil Action 
No. 3:02-CV-823 (NAM/DEP), Dkt. No. 52. The 
discovery deadline in the two cases was later ex-
tended by me on January 24, 2005 to March 31, 
2005, and again on March 21, 2005 until April 29, 
2005-the currently operative discovery deadline. See 
Civil Action No. 3.02-CV-823 (NAM/DEP) Entries 
dated January 18, 2005 and March 21, 2005; Civil 
Action No. 3:02-CV-846 (NAM/DEP) Entries dated 
January 24,2005 and March 21, 2005. 
FN1. Those scheduling orders superseded 
earlier case management orders issued in the 
action by my predecessor, then-Magistrate 
Judge Gary L. Sharpe. 
At intervals over the time period spanning from 
April 14, 2005 until April 29, 2005, plaintiffs sent 
defendants various requests for admissions, pursuant 
to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
seeking admission of sixty-five separately stated 
facts. Those requests, which followed the service of 
three prior sets of requests for admissions in this 
action and additional such requests in a separate but 
related state court suit, went unanswered by defen-
dants William Brodeur and Northeast Fabricators, 
LLC, despite the passage of more than thirty days.— 
The failure of those defendants to respond to the dis-
puted requests has led plaintiffs' counsel to seek this 
court's assistance in enforcing them through the entry 
of an order deeming the facts set forth within them to 
have been admitted by the defaulting defendants. 
FN2. The disputed requests for admissions 
were directed to defendants William 
Brodeur and Northeast Fabricators, LLC, 
who are jointly represented by a single at-
torney, and Sean McNamee, who is sepa-
rately represented. Those requests have ap-
parently been answered by defendant 
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McNamee, despite their alleged untimeli-
ness. 
II. DISCUSSION 
At the heart of the pending dispute is the re-
quirement under this court's local rules and uniform 
pretrial scheduling orders that all discovery requests 
in a case must be served sufficiently in advance of 
the discovery deadline to allow for service of timely 
responses prior to the assigned discovery deadline. 
Northern District of New York Local Rule 16.2; Civil 
Action No. 3:02-CV-823 (NAM/DEP) Dkt. No. 52, If 
6; Civil Action No. 02-CV-846 (NAM/DEP) Dkt. 
No. 43, | 6. Defendants maintain that these provi-
sions control and render plaintiffs' requests for ad-
missions fatally defective, thereby obviating their 
need to respond to the untimely requests. Plaintiffs 
counter that requests for admissions are not discovery 
devices, and thus may be served at any time prior to 
trial without regard to the governing uniform pretrial 
scheduling orders and local rule provisions.— 
FN3. Plaintiffs also argue that by virtue of 
their failure to object to the untimeliness of 
the requests for admissions in issue, defen-
dants have waived their right to resist an-
swering them on this basis. I reject this con-
tention. If, as defendants now argue, the re-
quests for admissions were subject to the 
governing discovery cut-off provisions, they 
were void ab initio as a result of the fact that 
they were not served sufficiently in advance 
of the discovery deadline to permit timely 
responses, and no objection on this basis 
was required to preserve the timeliness ar-
gument. 
*2 It is true, as plaintiffs argue, that requests for 
admissions are not discovery devices in the tradi-
tional sense. While discovery mechanisms such as 
requests for document production, interrogatories, 
and depositions typically seek to uncover information 
for use in pursuing or defending against a litigated 
claim, requests for admissions serve the distinctly 
different purpose of assisting the parties and the court 
to narrow the factual issues to be presented for de-
termination in connection with such a claim, either on 
motion or at trial. See Henry? v. Champlain Enters ., 
Inc.. 212 F.R.D. 73, 77 (N.D.N.Y.2003) (Treece, 
M.J.); see also Booth Oil Site Admin. Group v. 
Safetv-Kleen Corp. 194 F.R.D. 76, 79 
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(W.D.N.Y.2000): T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund. 
Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co.. Inc.. 174 F.R.D. 38, 42 
(S.D.N.Y.1997). Rule 36 "is not properly speaking a 
discovery device, rather it is 'a procedure for obtain-
ing admissions for the record of facts already known' 
by the seeker." Dubin v. E.F. Button Group Inc.. 125 
F.R .D. 372, 375 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (citing and quoting 
8 C. Wright & Miller. Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2252(1970)). 
Despite this functional differentiation, the ques-
tion of whether a request for admissions should be 
considered a discovery device is one on which the 
courts, including within this circuit, are markedly 
divided. Contrast Henry. 212 F.R.D. at 77 (holding 
that requests for admissions are not discovery de-
vices); T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund. Inc.. 174 
F.R.D. at 42 (same); Dubin. 125 F.R.D. at 375 (same) 
with Revlon Consumer Prods.. Corp. v. Estee Lauder 
Cos.. Inc.. No. 00 CIV.5960, 2001 WL 521832, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y.Mavl6,2001) ("There should be no doubt 
that Requests for Admissions pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 are a discovery device[.]"). This 
schizophrenic approach appears to be owing at least 
in part to placement of the rule governing requests for 
admissions within the portion of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure between Rule 26 and Rule 37, a sec-
tion generally considered as reserved to pretrial dis-
covery. See Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp., 2001 
WL 521832. at *1. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding 
whether a request for admissions is properly regarded 
as a discovery device, the majority of courts which 
have addressed the precise issue now presented have 
concluded that requests for admissions should be 
subject to case management discovery deadlines. 
Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp.. 2001 WL 521832, at 
*1 ("Even if Rule 36 RFAs were not a true discovery 
device, the Court holds that the discovery cut-off date 
should apply to RFAs as well as more procedural 
discovery devices."); Bailey v. Broder, No. 94 Civ. 
2394, 1997 WL 752423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 
1997) ("While there is some disagreement as to the 
issue among districts across the country, in this cir-
cuit there is not, and the courts have consistently held 
that requests for admission are to be made within the 
discovery deadline.") (collecting cases); Giraldi v. 
Mann. No. 93-CV-693, 1995 WL 574451, at *4 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.) ("The magis-
trate judge acted appropriately in not considering the 
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requests for admissions for two reasons: 1) the re-
quests were not filed until May 6, 1994, after the 
deadline for discovery had passed[.]"); see also 
Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 2257 (2005 Supp.) ("Even though they are 
not technically discovery requests, requests for ad-
missions have been held subject to discovery cut off 
dates."). But see Greenfield v. Mem'l Sloan Kettering 
Hosp., No. 95 Civ. 7658, 2000 WL 351395. at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2000) ("There is apparently no 
clearly defined precedent [on the question of whether 
requests for admissions are governed by discovery 
deadlines] from the Second Circuit [.]"). Having 
carefully examined the conflicting authority regard-
ing this issue, I find that the interests of promoting 
orderly and efficient litigation are best served by sub-
jecting requests for admissions to case management 
discovery deadlines, and therefore join those several 
courts which have adopted this position. And, from 
this finding it follows that requests for admissions are 
also included among the devices contemplated under 
Local Rule 16.2 as having to be served sufficiently in 
advance of the prescribed discovery cutoff to permit 
timely responses to be served prior to that deadline. 
*3 Admitting of some ambiguity surrounding the 
issue, I am tempted to overlook the untimeliness of 
the requests in issue and to require defendants to pro-
vide responses to those requests, following District 
Judge Thomas Duffy's reasoning in Greenfield, based 
upon his perception in that case that the question of 
whether requests for admissions were subject to the 
assigned discovery deadline had been left unad-
dressed by the court when discussing scheduling is-
sues. 2000 WL 351395, at *5. Given the extent of 
discovery demands previously served by the plain-
tiffs in this case and the related state court action, 
however, as well as my review of the disputed re-
quests, which are both numerous and seem to extend 
in scope well beyond what I would expect as being 
necessary to accomplish the potentially productive 
purpose to be served by Rule 36,1 choose not to ex-
ercise my discretion to overlook the untimeliness of 
those requests. Based upon my extensive involve-
ment in this case, I believe that all parties have had a 
fair and adequate opportunity to engage in pretrial 
discovery, and to prepare for motion practice and for 
trial. 
III. SUMMARY AND ORDER 
The desirable ends of promoting orderly and ef-
ficient litigation of matters pending in this court are 
best served by treating requests for admissions, 
though not discovery devices in the traditional sense, 
as being subject to the court's requirement that dis-
covery in an action be completed on or before an 
assigned deadline, and additionally that all discovery 
requests be served sufficiently in advance of that 
deadline to permit timely responses before the as-
signed discovery cutoff. Accordingly, plaintiffs' re-
quest for an order deeming the facts set forth in the 
five sets of requests for admissions now in dispute to 
have been admitted by the defendants will be denied, 
and defendants' cross-motion for a protective order 
will be granted. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that plaintiffs' request pursuant to 
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a 
declaration that the facts set forth in the five requests 
for admissions served on and after April 14, 2005 be 
deemed admitted by the defendants (02-CV-823, Dkt. 
No. 100) is DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED, that defendants' cross-motion for a 
protective order, pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, excusing them from 
the requirement of responding to the disputed request 
for admissions on the basis of their untimeliness (02-
CV-823, Dkt. No. 105) is hereby GRANTED; and it 
is further 
ORDERED, that the clerk is directed to promptly 
forward copies of this order to the parties' respective 
attorneys by electronic means. 
N.D.N.Y.,2005. 
Brodeur v. McNamee 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 1774033 
(N.D.N.Y.) 
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United States District Court, M.D. Florida, 
Tampa Division. 
JIM BOAST DODGE, INC, d/b/a Bob Boast Dodge, 
a Florida Corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAIMLER CHRYSLER MOTORS COMPANY, 




Named Expert: Joseph F. Roesner 
William G. Osborne, William G. Osborne, P.A, Or-
lando, FL, for Plaintiff. 
C. Everett Boyd. Jr.. Dean Bunch. Sutherland, Asbill 
& Brennan, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant. 
ORDER 
MARK A. PIZZO. United States Magistrate Judge. 
*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plain-
tiffs Motion to Compel Proper Responses to Plain-
tiffs Second Request to Produce (doc. 25) and De-
fendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by Plaintiffs 
Proposed Expert (doc. 21). A hearing was held on the 
matter on January 16, 2007. 
This district follows the rule that the completion 
date for discovery means just that-all discovery must 
be completed by that date. Middle District Discovery 
(2001) at § I.F.I (emphasis in rule). Hence, requests 
for production, as an example, must be served more 
than thirty days prior to the completion date to permit 
the opposing party to respond before the discovery 
deadline. Id; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b\ If the 
parties agree to conduct discovery after the Court's 
discovery deadline, they cannot expect the Court to 
resolve their post-deadline discovery disputes. Id. 
Moreover, the Court expects the parties to address 
discovery disputes promptly-before the discovery 
deadline passes or soon thereafter. See Ellison v. 
Windt 2001 WL 118617 (M.D.Fla.200n (motion to 
strike filed after discovery deadline untimely); see 
also Suntrust Bank v. Blue Water Fiber, L.P., 210 
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F.R.D. 196. 200-201 (E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing 
cases from various districts citing general principle);-
Sales v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 632 
F.Supp. 435 (N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed 
after the close of discovery was untimely). 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Proper Responses 
to Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (doc. 25) 
is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by 
Plaintiffs Proposed Expert (doc. 21) is DENIED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
3. Plaintiffs Expert Report is due January 30, 
2007. 
4. Defendant's Expert Report is due February 13, 
2007. 
5. No other deadlines set forth in the Court's Case 
Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 12) are 
affected by this Order. 
DONE AND ORDERED. 
M.D.Fla.,2007. 
Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors 
Co., LLC 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 4409781 
(M.D.Fla.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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United States District Court, D. Kansas. 
Willard D. EPLING, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC., #k/a UCB Cello, Inc., Defen-
dant. 
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC, Defendant. 
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UCB FILMS, INC, Defendant. 
Nos. 98-4226-RDR, 98-4227-RDR, 00-4062-RDR. 
April 2, 2001. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ROGERS. 
*1 These cases are presently before the court 
upon the following motions: (1) plaintiffs' petitions 
for review of magistrate's order dated August 7, 2000 
—; (2) plaintiffs' petitions for review of magistrate's 
order dated August 31, 2000; (3) plaintiffs' petitions 
for review of magistrate's order dated September 22, 
2000; (4) plaintiffs' petitions for review of magis-
trate's order dated January 24, 2001; and (5) plaintiff 
Hladky's petition for review of magistrate's order 
dated January 31, 2001. Having carefully reviewed 
the arguments of the parties, the court is now pre-
pared to rule. 
FN1. In connection with this motion, the 
parties have filed several other motions. 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike de-
fendant's amended motion to file surreply. 
The defendant has filed a motion for the 
court to disregard plaintiffs' response to de-
fendant's surreply. The court has now read 
both the surreply and the response to the sur-
reply. Little purpose would now be served in 
granting these motions. Accordingly, the 
court shall deny both of these motions. The 
court, however, certainly does not wish to 
encourage the filing of surreplies and re-
sponses to surreplies. In addition, the court 
warns plaintiffs' counsel that leave to file a 
response to a surreply is necessary prior to 
O 9 0 1 1 TVinTYicnn Ppn t^ ro XTr> 
filing such a pleading. In this instance, the 
court will waive that requirement, but this 
requirement should be complied with in the 
future. 
As the court has explained in the past, these 
cases have long and tortured histories. This is indeed 
remarkable because the cases are actually quite sim-
ple. These cases involve allegations of refusal to hire. 
Actions containing such allegations are usually 
among the quickest and easiest in the area of em-
ployment discrimination. Discovery is generally sim-
plified. The motions presently under consideration 
clearly indicate that these cases have not fallen into 
the quick and simple category. These cases have been 
beset with problems from the outset. The instant mo-
tions suggest that the parties, particularly the plain-
tiffs, fail to understand how the discovery process 
should work. The following comments have some 
application here: "Courts have long understood that 
the administration of justice will be gravely jeopard-
ized unless the discovery and disclosure systems are 
largely self-executing. The resources of the courts 
would be taxed upon endurance if more than a tiny 
percentage of discovery or disclosure proceedings 
generated disputes that judges were forced to re-
solve." 7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 37.23 (3d 
ed.2000). 
An exhaustive and exhausting review of the re-
cord reveals considerable bickering and acrimony 
between counsel. It is clear that the magistrate has 
been confronted with unusually contentious counsel, 
and we commend him on the enormous restraint he 
has exercised in presiding over these cases. The court 
hopes that counsel will make every effort in the fu-
ture to work together to prepare these cases for trial 
or final disposition. 
The court shall now provide some background 
on these cases. For many years, Dupont, Inc. and 
Flexel, Inc. operated a cellophane manufacturing 
plant in Tecumseh, Kansas. In 1996, Flexel closed 
the plant and terminated all of its employees. UCB 
Films, Inc. purchased the plant and began seeking 
employees in 1997. Adecco, an employment agency, 
acted as agent for UCB in the hiring process by pro-
viding administrative testing and employment ser-
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vices. Willard Epling and Paula Hladky are husband 
and wife. They had previously worked at the Tecum-
seh plant for a number of years as coating operators. 
Each applied for the position of coating operator. 
UCB did not offer a job to either one. 
The court's standard of review concerning a 
magistrate judge's determination of a nondispositive 
issue is whether the decision has been shown to be 
"clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The moving party 
must show that the magistrate's order is "clearly erro-
neous or contrary to law." Hutchinson v. Pfeil 105 
F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997V The "clearly errone-
ous" standard requires that the court affirm the deci-
sion of the magistrate unless "on the entire evidence 
[the court] is left with the definite conviction that a 
mistake has been committed." United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see 
also Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 
1458. 1462 00th Cir.l988V 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AU-
GUST 7,2000 ORDER 
*2 On August 7, 2000, the magistrate issued a 
fifty-seven page order concerning a number of dis-
covery disputes. Plaintiffs seek review of almost 
every adverse ruling contained in that order. Some of 
the objections raised by the plaintiffs concern key 
issues in the discovery process, i.e., the scope of the 
discovery of the defendant's employment records, 
while others refer to very specific and sometimes 
inconsequential matters. 
The court does intend to address the issues raised 
by the parties, but in the interests of time, the discus-
sions will be limited. 
Defendant's Motions for Protective Orders 
Plaintiff served a subpoena duces tecum on 
Shirley Martin-Smith, the owner of Adecco, request-
ing that she produce nine categories of documents 
relating to the employment applications of all indi-
viduals who applied for employment with UCB from 
July through December 1997. The defendant sought a 
protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to quash 
the subpoena requests. UCB argued that the docu-
ments should not be produced because it had owner-
ship and control over them. Plaintiffs responded that 
UCB did not have standing to object to a subpoena 
served on a third party. 
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The magistrate agreed with the arguments made 
by the plaintiffs. The magistrate denied the defen-
dant's motions for protective orders. The magistrate, 
however, failed to address whether plaintiffs were 
entitled to sanctions. Plaintiffs contend in this motion 
that the court should now award fees and expenses to 
them. The defendant suggests that the plaintiffs are 
not entitled to fees and expenses because its position 
was "substantially justified." 
The court finds that this issue should be re-
manded to the magistrate for consideration of 
whether attorney's fees and expenses should be 
awarded to the plaintiff. The court believes that the 
magistrate simply overlooked this issue. We believe 
that the magistrate should have the first opportunity 
to consider it since he is thoroughly familiar with the 
background of the motions for protective order. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Responses to Defen-
dant's Objections to Duces Tecum Deposition Sub-
poenas and Notices 
In April and early June 1999, plaintiffs served 
deposition notices and subpoenas duces tecum on Jim 
Oldham, Bob Morris, Jeanne Hippe and Larry Mont-
gomery, four management employees of UCB. UCB 
objected to the document requests contained in the 
notices/subpoenas on the grounds that they were un-
intelligible, overbroad, vague, ambiguous, unduly 
burdensome and irrelevant. UCB also objected to the 
notice/subpoena served on Montgomery because it 
did not afford UCB thirty days to respond to the 
document requests. In response, plaintiffs filed mo-
tions to compel the production of the requested 
documents and sought permission from the court to 
reopen the four depositions if, and when, such docu-
ments were produced. Both parties sought sanctions 
against the other. 
In his order, the magistrate overruled the major-
ity of UCB's objections and ordered the production of 
documents pertaining to the hiring of coating opera-
tors from July 1997 to the present. In addition, the 
magistrate granted plaintiffs' request to reopen the 
depositions of Oldham, Morris and Hippe for ques-
tioning concerning the forthcoming coating operator 
documents, but denied the request to reopen Mont-
gomery's deposition. The magistrate denied plaintiffs' 
request to reopen Montgomery's deposition because 
they had not provided him with the thirty days neces-
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sary to produce documents as required by 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(5) and 34. Finally, the magistrate 
denied the parties' cross-motions for sanctions. 
*3 Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in 
refusing to reopen Montgomery's deposition and in 
refusing to award expenses in connection with the 
filing of the motions to compel. Plaintiffs assert that 
they should have been allowed to reopen Montgom-
ery's deposition because they would have had the 
necessary documents if the defendant had produced 
those documents for the other depositions. They fur-
ther argue that they did not take contrary positions 
concerning the scope of their discovery requests. 
Thus, they contend that they were entitled to fees and 
expenses in connection with the preparation of re-
sponses to defendant's objections to duces tecum 
subpoenas and the retaking of the depositions of Old-
ham, Morris and Hippe. 
In denying the plaintiffs' requests to reopen 
Montgomery's deposition, the magistrate ruled as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs did not provide Montgomery with the 
requisite thirty days to provide the documents. While 
the Court has ruled that this failure to give the requi-
site notice relieved Defendant of producing the re-
quested documents at his deposition, Defendant still 
had the obligation to object and/or produce the 
documents within the thirty-day time period. Since 
Defendant did timely serve objections to the Mont-
gomery requests and the Court has overruled those 
objections, Defendant must still produce the docu-
ments (as limited by Plaintiffs to the individuals hired 
for the Coating Operator positions). The Court does 
not find, however, that Defendant has the obligation 
to re-produce Montgomery for his deposition since 
Defendant had no obligation in the first place to pro-
duce the documents at his June 14, 1999 deposition. 
The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs' requests to 
reopen Montgomery's deposition. 
In denying sanctions to the plaintiffs, the magis-
trate noted that the plaintiffs had taken contrary posi-
tions as to the scope of information sought, i.e., at the 
time of depositions, plaintiffs claimed they were re-
questing information pertaining to all applications for 
all open positions, while in their reply briefs to the 
motions to compel, they claimed to have sought in-
formation pertaining only to the hiring of coating 
operators. The magistrate indicated that he would 
have agreed with the defendant that plaintiffs' re-
quests were overbroad if plaintiffs had continued to 
insist that they were entitled to all applications for all 
positions at the plant. The magistrate found in plain-
tiffs' favor on the motions to compel only because he 
determined that plaintiffs had narrowed their requests 
in the reply briefs. In sum, the magistrate found it 
unjust to impose sanctions against the defendant be-
cause of the contrary positions taken by the plaintiffs 
as to the scope of the document requests. 
The court has carefully evaluated the record, the 
magistrate's order concerning these issues, and the 
arguments of the parties. The court does not find that 
the magistrate's decisions were clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Dis-
covery of Specific Documents 
*4 In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motion to com-
pel disclosure and discovery of specific documents. 
In particular, the motions sought production of a 
spreadsheet prepared by Gina Berti, former office 
manager of Adecco, and a "client file" maintained at 
Adecco's office. Plaintiffs also sought to reopen 
Berti's deposition if, and when, the court ordered 
these documents to be produced. 
In his order, the magistrate ordered discovery of 
both the spreadsheet and the "client file" upon the 
condition that the information in each be limited to 
plaintiffs' prospective employing unit, the coating 
department. To ensure the limitation on the scope of 
discovery, the magistrate permitted UCB to redact or 
remove any information from these documents that 
concerned positions outside the coating department. 
In addition, the magistrate ordered Berti's deposition 
to be reopened for purposes of questioning her about 
coating department information contained in these 
documents. The magistrate refused to award sanc-
tions to either of the plaintiffs concerning these mo-
tions to compel. 
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in (1) 
limiting the scope of discovery; (2) not imposing 
judicial oversight over defendant's redaction of 
documents; and (3) not awarding expenses in connec-
tion with the filing of the motions to compel. 
The court shall first consider the scope of dis-
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covery issue. Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate has 
unduly restricted discovery contrary to established 
Tenth Circuit law. Plaintiffs contend that they are 
entitled to discovery of all information regarding in-
dividuals who applied for jobs at the Tecumseh plant. 
The defendant had originally argued that the scope of 
discovery should be limited to include only the appli-
cants for coating operator positions. The magistrate 
rejected the arguments of both sides and determined 
that discovery would encompass all positions within 
the coating department, not just the coating operator 
positions. The issue of the appropriate scope of dis-
covery arises frequently in the motions for review 
filed by plaintiffs. 
The scope of discovery "is limited only by rele-
vance and burdensomeness." Weahkee v. Norton. 
621 F.2d 1080. 1082 (10th Cir.1980). Discovery in. 
employment discrimination cases depends heavily 
upon the particular circumstances of the case. A court: 
may establish appropriate limits in order to balance 
the needs and rights of both plaintiff and defendant. 
The Tenth Circuit has not, as suggested by plaintiffs, 
adopted a policy of always allowing plant-wide dis-
covery in employment discrimination actions. See 
Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th 
Cir.1973) (in disparate impact case, Tenth Circuit 
affirms district court's order limiting discovery to 
single store where plaintiff employed rather than 
permitting broader discovery company-wide to all 
stores). Rather, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that 
district courts have broad discretion in discovery mat-
ters, and have examined the relevance and the bur-
densomeness of the request. In the context of investi-
gating an individual complaint of disparate treatment, 
such as exists in the instant cases, the Tenth Circuit 
has recognized that discovery may appropriately be 
limited to employment units, departments and sec-
tions in which employees similarly situated to plain-
tiff are employed. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. 
591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.1979) (limiting discovery in 
gender discrimination case to plaintiffs department); 
see also Haselhorst v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 163 
F.R.D. 10 (D.Kan. 1995) (discovery limited to em-
ploying unit); Earley v. Champion International 
Corp.. 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.1990) (limiting dis-
covery in Title VII cases to employing unit); 
Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 
588, 592 (5th Cir.1978) (where individual case of 
disparate treatment is alleged, focus in discovery 
should be on employing unit or work unit). To justify 
the court's consideration beyond the employing unit 
or work unit, the plaintiff must show a more particu-
larized need and relevance. Haselhorst. 163 F.R.D. 
at 11. 
*5 The court does not find the magistrate's deci-
sion to limit discovery to the coating department 
clearly erroneous. The court finds that the magistrate 
properly concluded that plaintiffs had not shown a 
particularized need and relevance for the plant-wide 
discovery. In sum, the court finds no basis to the ob-
jections offered by the plaintiffs. 
The court also does not find that the magistrate's 
decision not to impose any judicial oversight over the 
defendant's redactions of the spreadsheet and client 
file was clearly erroneous. The court is in agreement 
with the defendant that this is a matter that can be 
managed by the parties. 
Finally, we shall address the issue of sanctions. 
This presents an interesting question. The facts are 
not in dispute. The motion filed by plaintiff Hladky 
was entitled "Motion to Compel Disclosure of Spe-
cific Documents and for Sanctions." The motion and 
accompanying memorandum, however, failed to ad-
dress the issue of sanctions. The motion filed by 
plaintiff Epling did not mention sanctions either in its 
title or anywhere in the motion or accompanying 
memorandum. Under these circumstances, the magis-
trate determined that plaintiffs had not requested 
sanctions. In addition, he determined that sanctions 
should not be awarded because he did not grant the 
motions in their entireties. 
Sanctions shall be allowed when a motion to 
compel discovery is granted or if the requested dis-
covery is provided after the filing of the motion, 
unless the court finds that the motion was filed with-
out the movant making a good faith effort to obtain 
the discovery, or that the opposing party's nondisclo-
sure was substantially justified, or that other circum-
stances make the award of expenses unjust. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(A). Expenses may be appor-
tioned among the parties in a just maimer where the 
motion to compel is grant in part and denied in part. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). 
Given the language of Rule 37(a)(4)(A), the 
court does not agree with the magistrate that a party 
needs to request sanctions when filing a motion to 
compel under Rule 37. There is a presumption in 
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favor of expense shifting sanctions under Rule 
37(a)(4)(A). Unless an exception applies, the rule 
provides that sanctions should be applied. Accord-
ingly, we do not see that the rule requires a request or 
argument for sanctions. Nevertheless, the court does 
not find the magistrate's decision not to award sanc-
tions clearly erroneous. If a motion to compel discov-
ery is granted in part and denied in part, the court 
may apportion expense shifting sanctions among par-
ties "in a just manner." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). The 
motions filed by the plaintiffs were granted in part 
and denied in part. The magistrate declined to enter 
sanctions. This court does not find that this decision 
was clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Dis-
covery and for Sanctions 
In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motions to compel 
disclosure and discovery of interrogatories and re-
quests for production of documents to defendant. The 
majority of the defendant's objections to plaintiffs' 
discovery requests focused on the aforementioned 
dispute over the scope of discovery, i.e., whether 
plaintiffs were entitled to discover information re-
garding all applicants for all positions at UCB from 
July 1997 to the present. The defendant also objected 
to the number of interrogatories propounded by each 
plaintiff because they exceeded the number permitted 
by Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a). In their motions, plaintiffs 
again requested sanctions for filing the motions. 
*6 The magistrate once again held that discovery 
was limited to information pertaining to plaintiffs' 
prospective employing unit, the coating department. 
He further ruled that the number of interrogatories for 
both plaintiffs exceeded the number permitted by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He estimated that 
the number of interrogatories propounded by Epling, 
including subparts, ranged from 25 to 168 interroga-
tories, while the number propounded by Hladky 
ranged from 21 to 89 separate interrogatories. He 
ordered plaintiffs to select twenty-five from those 
already propounded to resubmit to the defendant. In 
addition to his general rulings, the magistrate made 
numerous determinations on the scope of the individ-
ual requests for production of documents. Finally, he 
denied plaintiffs' request for sanctions under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). 
In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magis-
trate erred in (1) limiting plaintiffs' discovery to in-
(P) 9 0 1 1 TVi^rv»c^« Daii+Ai»« XT^ 
formation pertaining to their prospective employing 
unit, the coating department; (2) determining that the 
interrogatories exceeded the number allowed by Rule 
31 and requiring them to repropound only twenty-
five interrogatories; (3) denying several of their re-
quests for production of documents; and (4) denying 
their request for sanctions. 
The court has carefully considered all of the ar-
guments raised by the plaintiffs. We find no merit to 
any of them. The court finds that the magistrate care-
fully and properly ruled on each of the aforemen-
tioned matters. The court does not find that any of 
these rulings were clearly erroneous. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to File Amended Complaints 
In July 1999, plaintiffs sought to amend their 
complaints to add retaliation claims and to amend 
their age discrimination claims to include allegations 
that they both sought "any job" at the Tecumseh 
plant. The magistrate denied these motions as un-
timely. In December 1999, plaintiffs sought leave to 
file second amended complaints to add UCB, Inc. as 
a defendant. Epling also sought leave to amend to 
add four new plaintiffs. The magistrate also denied 
the motions to amend as untimely. He further denied 
motions to add UCB, Inc. as a defendant as futile. In 
this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magistrate 
erred in denying their motions to amend. Plaintiffs 
argue, inter alia, that the magistrate failed to consider 
whether the defendant would suffer any prejudice as 
a result of granting either motion to amend. 
While leave to amend "shall be freely given 
when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). the 
decision "is within the discretion of the trial court." 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 
U.S. 321, 330 (1971). "[A] district court acts within 
the bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to 
amend for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Prejudice 
to the opposing party need not be shown also." First 
City Bank N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 
820 F.2d 1127. 1133 (10th Cir. 1987). 
*7 After considering all of the facts surrounding 
the motions to amend filed by both plaintiffs, the 
court does not find that the magistrate's decisions to 
deny the motions to amend based on untimeliness 
were clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The court 
believes the magistrate thoroughly examined the is-
sues and reached a decision within the bounds of his 
•t-^ r\~:~ T TO r* —. n r ^ - i -
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discretion. Given this decision, the court finds it un-
necessary to address the rulings made by the magis-
trate concerning the futility of the proposed amend-
ments. Moreover, the court notes that recent events 
have rendered portions of the motions to amend 
moot. The court has denied motions to dismiss in two 
cases filed by the plaintiffs after these cases that 
raised many of the allegations contained in the mo-
tions to amend. 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Determine Sufficiency of Re-
sponses to Admissions 
On June 16, 1999, plaintiffs served requests for 
admission upon the defendant. The deadline for serv-
ing discovery requests was June 15, 1999. In August 
1999, plaintiffs sought to determine the sufficiency of 
the defendant's responses ito the requests for admis-
sions. The defendant objected to the requests for ad-
missions, arguing that they were untimely served. 
The magistrate agreed. The magistrate denied the 
plaintiffs' motion to determine the sufficiency of the 
responses to the requests for admissions. The magis-
trate determined that the requests for admissions were 
a form of discovery and that they were untimely be-
cause they had been served after the discovery dead-
line. The magistrate stated that, in order to be timely, 
the requests needed to be served on or before May 
13, 1999, so that responses could be filed prior to the 
discovery deadline. The magistrate also granted de-
fendant's request for sanctions. 
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in 
finding the requests for admissions untimely and in 
imposing sanctions. Plaintiffs assert that requests for 
admission are not discovery tools and were, there-
fore, not subject to the discovery deadline established 
by the magistrate. Plaintiffs further argue that sanc-
tions should not have been imposed because past 
practices in this court and precedent from other juris-
dictions supported the position taken by them before 
the magistrate. 
The question of whether discovery deadlines ap-
ply to requests for admission is the subject of much 
dispute. Compare Jarvis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
161 F.R.D. 337, 339 (N.D.Miss.1995) (requests for 
admission are a form of discovery and are therefore 
subject to the discovery deadline) with O'Neill v. 
Medad 166 F.R.D. 19. 21 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (requests 
for admissions are not general discovery device and 
therefore are not subject to discovery deadlines) and 
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Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 124 F.R.D. 614. 615 
fW.D.Tenn.1989) (same) and with Kershner y. Beloit 
Corp., 106 F.R.D. 498.499 (D.Maine 1985) (requests 
for admissions are subject to discovery deadline but 
should be answered even if untimely unless opposing 
party shows some prejudice). 
*8 Having reviewed this contradictory precedent, 
none of which comes from the Tenth Circuit or the 
District of Kansas, the court is persuaded that the 
decision of the magistrate was not clearly erroneous 
or contrary to law. The court, however, does find that 
the magistrate's decision to award sanctions was 
clearly erroneous. The magistrate found the argu-
ments of the plaintiffs frivolous and disingenuous. 
We cannot agree. The state of the law on this issue is 
clearly unsettled. The court finds that the arguments 
of the plaintiffs were substantially justified. We be-
lieve that the imposition of sanctions under these 
circumstances was inappropriate. See Bieganek v. 
Wilson. 110 F.R.D. 77. 78 fN.D.I11.1986). Accord-
ingly, the court shall vacate the award of sanctions to 
the defendant on this issue. 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Extension of Expert Disclosure 
and Discoyery Deadline 
In June 1999, plaintiffs moved to extend the ex-
pert disclosure deadlines by sixty days. The magis-
trate denied the motion. The court does not find that 
this decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to 
law. 
PLAINTIFF HLADKY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW 
OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF AUGUST 31, 
2000 
In response to the magistrate's order of August 7, 
2000, the defendant produced approximately 20,000 
pages of documents to plaintiffs. The defendant pho-
tocopied these documents and provided them to 
plaintiffs in eight large boxes. Plaintiffs complained 
about the method of the defendant's production. On 
August 31, 2000, the magistrate held a hearing to 
address plaintiffs' complaints. At that time, plaintiffs 
argued that Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b): (1) required the de-
fendant to organize and identify documents to corre-
spond with the categories in plaintiffs' document re-
quests; and (2) produce original documents rather 
than copies. The magistrate denied plaintiffs' com-
plaints, finding that the defendant had adequately 
complied with the requirements of Rule 34(b). The 
magistrate found no merit to the arguments raised by 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby 
move this Court for an Order amending the Scheduling Order so that all discovery deadlines will be moved 
back three months. The grounds for this motion, as more fully set forth in the in the accompanying 
Consolidated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion to Amend the 
Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are that Plaintiff needs 
more time to seek responses to her outstanding discovery and to take the deposition of the Defendants. 
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5. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE: The parties request a pretrial conference in August 2008. 
6. ALLOCATION OF FAULT: The cutoff date for filing a notice to allocate fault pursuant to 
Rule 9(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is February 4,2008. 
7. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS: The cutoff date for filing dispositive, or potentially dispositive 
motions is April 28, 2008. 
8. SETTLMENT: The potential for settlement at this time is unknown. 
9. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The potential for resolution of this matter 
through the Court's alternative dispute resolution program is unknown at this time. 
10. WITNESS AND EXHBIT LISTS: The final lists of witnesses and exhibits, or objections 
thereto, are due in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4). 
11. TRIAL: The parties will be ready for trial by August 2008. The estimated length of trial is five 
(5) days. 
12. SERVICE: So long as a hard-copy is sent within 24 hours via U.S. Mail, the parties may serve 
each other through email at the following address: for Plaintiff: ssc@hclawlirm.net; 
bmoss@Jiclawfirm.net; jsteeleffijhclawfirm.net; and for Defendants: bwlffibmgtrial.com . 
DATED: llf fld'Z- DATED: / / / ? / * / 
Slfeve S. Christensen / ^J£€njamin W. Lieberman 
Brennan H. Moss 
Jeffrey J. Steele 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendants 
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2. DISCOVERY: Discovery is necessary on the following subjects: Plaintiffs claims and 
damages; Defendants' claims and defenses to Plaintiffs claims; and other matters as needed. 
a. FACT DISCOVERY: Fact discovery shall be completed by no later than April 7,2008. 
b. EXPERT DISCOVERY: Expert designations and reports shall be due under Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) as follows: 
i. Designation of expert witnesses is due by Plaintiff on May 5,2008, and by 
Defendants on June 2,2008. 
ii. Rebuttal reports from both parties are due on or before June 16, 2008. 
iii. The deadline to depose all experts for both parties shall be July 14,2008. 
c. METHODS/LIMITATIONS OF DISCOVERY: The parties may utilize the following 
discovery methods: 
i. twenty Five (25) interrogatories per party, unless otherwise stipulated by the 
parties; 
ii. requests for Admissions, as provided by the Rules; 
iii. requests for Production of Documents, as provided by the Rules; and 
iv. no more than fifteen (15) oral exam depositions, unless otherwise stipulated by 
the parties. 
3. SUPPLEMENTATION: Supplementation to discovery under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(e) shall be due 30 days from the time the party learns that prior disclosures or responses to discovery 
are incomplete or incorrect. 
4. AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS: The parties shall have until February 4, 2008, to join 
additional parties or to amend pleadings. 
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Case No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
The parties have met and conferred in accordance with Rule 26(f)(1). The Court hereby enters 
the following Scheduling Order based upon the parties' stipulation: 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURES: Initial disclosures required under U.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) shall be 
exchanged by the parties by November 19, 2007. 
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In her petitions for review, plaintiff contends that 
the magistrate erred in denying her motion to take the 
depositions of Wilbanks and Gaynor by telephone. 
Plaintiff argues initially that there was no need for 
her to state a legitimate reason for the need to take a 
deposition by telephone because the need was obvi-
ous, i.e., to save costs. Plaintiff further contends that 
the legal and factual bases for denying her motion 
were inaccurate. 
*10 Rule 30(W7) provides that "the court upon 
motion may order that a deposition be taken by tele-
phone." As a general rule, this court believes that 
telephonic depositions should be broadly permitted. 
We are not convinced as suggested by the magistrate 
that a litigant must affirmatively state a reason for the 
taking of a deposition by telephone. The court notes 
that in Cressler v. Neuenschwander, 170 F.R.D. 20 
(D.Kan. 1996). a case relied upon by the magistrate, 
Judge Saffels stated that a "party seeking to depose a 
witness telephonically must present a legitimate rea-
son for its request." Cressler, 170 F.R.D. at 21. 
While we agree in substance with this statement, we 
are not persuaded that each case requires the state-
ment of a reason because the purpose for taking a 
deposition by telephone is obvious in most cases, i.e., 
the savings of time and costs. In this case, where 
plaintiff sought to take the depositions of individuals 
who were located in Atlanta, Georgia, we believe that 
the purpose was readily evident. Accordingly, the 
court finds the magistrate's decision to deny plain-
tiffs motion for this reason clearly erroneous. 
Once a motion to take a deposition by telephone 
is filed, the burden shifts to the other side to show 
why the depositions should proceed in the traditional 
manner. Cressler, 170 F.R.D. at 21. Here, the defen-
dant suggested that these depositions should not be 
taken by telephone because of the complexity of the 
case and the number of documents requested by the 
plaintiff. The magistrate agreed. Based upon informa-
tion presently before the court, we cannot say that the 
magistrate's decision was clearly erroneous. Accord-
ingly, this motion shall also be denied. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' 
petitions for review of the magistrate's order of Au-
gust 7, 2000 (Doc. # 132 in No. 98-4226 and Doc. # 
136 in No. 98-4227) be hereby granted in part and 
denied in part. On remand, the magistrate shall (1) 
consider whether sanctions should be awarded to 
plaintiffs in connection with defendant's motions for 
protective orders and (2) vacate the award of sanc-
tions to defendant in connection with plaintiffs' mo-
tions to determine sufficiency of responses to admis-
sions. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff 
Hladky's petition for review of the magistrate's order 
of August 31, 2000 (Doc. # 155 in No. 98-4226) be 
hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' peti-
tions for review of the magistrate's order of Septem-
ber 22, 2000 (Doc. # 165 in No. 98-4226) be hereby 
denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' peti-
tions for review of the magistrate's order of January 
24, 2001 (Doc. # 228 in No. 98-4226) be hereby de-
nied as moot. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff 
Hladky's petitions for review of the magistrate's order 
of January 31, 2001 (Doc.56 and 57 in No. 00-4062) 
be hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' mo-
tion to strike defendant's amended motion to file sur-
reply (Doc. # 186 in No. 98-4226) by hereby denied. 
*11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defen-
dant's motion to disregard plaintiffs' response to de-
fendant's surreply (Doc. # 211 in No. 98-4226) be 
hereby denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
D.Kan.,2001. 
Epling v. UCB Films, Inc. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2001 WL 584355 
(D.Kan.) 
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the plaintiffs. Plaintiff Hladky contends that the mag-
istrate erred in reaching this decision. 
The court does not find the decision of the mag-
istrate clearly erroneous. The court fails to find, 
based upon the information presented, that the docu-
ments produced by the defendant were not produced 
as they were kept in the ordinary course of business. 
In addition, the court finds nothing in Rule 34 that 
requires that a party produce originals rather than 
copies. In sum, plaintiffs petition for review shall be 
denied. 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF MAG-
ISTRATE'S ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 
2000 
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate 
ruled that the appropriate scope of discovery was the 
coating department of the Tecumseh plant for the 
time period from July 1997 through the present. The 
magistrate also ruled that the defendant did not have 
standing to object to or quash the subpoena duces 
tecum served by plaintiffs on Shirley Martin-Smith. 
Plaintiffs had previously served a subpoena duces 
tecum on Martin-Smith requesting all application 
documents of all individuals who applied for any 
positions at the Tecumseh plant during the time pe-
riod from July 1997 through December 1997. On or 
about September 11, 2000, plaintiffs issued an 
amended subpoena duces tecum on Shirley Martin-
Smith. Plaintiffs requested all application documents 
for all positions for the time period from July 1997 
through the present. The defendant responded with a 
motion to enforce the magistrate's August 7th order. 
*9 The magistrate granted the defendant's motion 
to enforce. The magistrate held that while plaintiffs 
were allowed to once again serve their deposition 
notice on Martin-Smith, they were not permitted to 
obtain documents concerning all positions at the Te-
cumseh plant because discovery had been limited to 
the coating department, plaintiffs' employing unit. 
In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magis-
trate erred in limiting the subpoena to documents 
concerning the coating department. Plaintiffs contend 
that they should have been allowed to proceed on the 
requests of the prior subpoena (with an expansion of 
the discovery time frame as established in the magis-
trate's August 7th order) because the magistrate had 
ruled that the defendant had no standing to quash the 
subpoena. 
This motion again raises the scope of discovery 
issue. Again and again, plaintiffs have suggested that 
discovery should be expanded to the entire plant be-
cause "all hiring decisions between July 1997 and the 
present have been made by the human resources 
managers Michael Machell and Jenne Hippe under 
the direct supervision of UCB vice president Joseph 
Wilbanks." As correctly pointed out by the defen-
dant, plaintiffs have never cited to any portion of the 
record to support the quoted material. Moreover, the 
defendant has repeatedly cited to evidence suggesting 
that the quoted material has no basis in fact. 
Once again, the court does not find that the mag-
istrate's decision was clearly erroneous. The magis-
trate has demonstrated a thorough understanding of 
these cases and the issues involved. Accordingly, this 
motion shall also be denied. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REVIEW OF MAG-
ISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANUARY 24, 2001 
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate 
held that the defendant was entitled to expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees, incurred in responding to 
plaintiffs' motions to determine the sufficiency of the 
responses to their requests for admissions. On Janu-
ary 24, 2001, the magistrate awarded sanctions to the 
defendant in the amount of $2,390.48. In this motion, 
plaintiffs object to the amount awarded. 
With the court's decision reversing the magis-
trate's award of sanctions, the court finds that this 
motion is moot. 
PLAINTIFF HLADKY'S PETITIONS FOR RE-
VIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANU-
ARY 31,2001 
On January 12, 2001, plaintiff Hladky filed a 
motion to take the noticed depositions of Joe Gaynor 
and Joe Wilbanks telephonically. The defendant op-
posed the plaintiffs motion and filed a motion for 
protective order. On January 31, 2001, the magistrate 
denied plaintiffs motion and granted defendant's mo-
tion. The magistrate determined that (1) plaintiff had 
not met her initial burden of demonstrating a legiti-
mate reason for taking the deposition by telephone; 
and (2) telephonic depositions were not appropriate 
due to the complexity of the case and number of 
documents requested. 
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HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNAN H. MOSS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
SCHEDULING ORDER was sent via U.S. Mail and e-mail on the 12th day of May, 2008, to the 
following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com 
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HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER 
DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
! 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, and 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) does hereby move this Court for an Order allowing for further discovery prior to its 
deteraiination of Defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment. The grounds for this motion, as more fully 
set forth in the accompanying Consolidated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, 
Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are 
that further discovery and depositions will expose the facts and illuminate the issues presented in 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Motion is also supported by the Declaration of Brennan 
H. Moss. 
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DATED this / £ day of May, 2008. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
JL.^^/^&L 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNAN H. MOSS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER 
DISCOVERY was sent via U.S. Mail and e-mail on thel2th day of May, 2008, to the following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER 
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, 
MOTION TO AMEND THE 
SCHEDULING ORDER, AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby 
submit the following Consolidated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion 
to Amend the Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, 
I. THE COURT SHOULD AMEND THE SCHEDULING ORDER TO ALLOW FOR 
MORE DISCOVERY 
Pursuant to Rule 26(f) (1), the parties met and conferred regarding following scheduling 
deadlines. As part of the meeting, the parties agreed that all fact discovery would be completed no later 
than April 7, 2008. When Plaintiff entered into the stipulation, it was overly optimistic about the time 
frame in which discovery could be completed. However, due to Motions filedin this case, and the time 
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constraints by other cases, it is apparent that Plaintiff needs more time to complete fact discovery and 
therefore has requested the Court to amend the Scheduling Order to move all discovery dates back by 
three months. 
The purpose of discovery is to expose the facts and illuminate the issues. See Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties 
is essential to proper litigation."). Utah's discovery rules are aimed at "facilitating fair trials with full 
disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence," Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999), and are designed so "the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly 
and expeditiously as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). By amending the 
Scheduling Order by moving all discovery dates back by three months, the Court will allow the parties 
to gather all relevant facts for the case, and will benefit the court by giving it the information it needs to 
determine the facts and resolve the issues. 
Therefore, in the interest of exposing the facts and illuminating the issues, the Court should grant 
Mrs. DahPs request to amend the scheduling order by moving the discovery deadlines back by three 
months. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER OUTSTANDING 
DISCOVERY AND TO SUBMIT TO A DEPOSTION 
Pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants moved for an 
order from the Court to Order Defendants to answer outstanding discovery and to submit to a 
deposition. The outstanding discovery goes to the heart of the issues in Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and they should provide answers prior to any consideration of summary 
judgment. 
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Specifically, Plaintiff propounded discovery to Defendants asking them to (1) identify 
any communications that they have had with Mr. Dahl's counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl; (2) 
identify any communications that they have had with Dr. Dahl; (3) identify all cases in which they 
have appeared or consulted that have involved Mr. Dahl's attorney; (4) identify all the cases in 
which they have appeared or consulted in that relate to Dr. Charles Dahl; (5) produce all documents 
relating to any communications between them and Dr. Charles Dahl; (6) produce all documents 
relating to any communications between them and Mr. Dahl's attorney or her agent, which 
related to Mrs. Dahl; (7) produce a list of each case in which they have represented clients against 
parties represented by Mr. Dahl's attorney; (8) produce each document relating to any business 
dealings they have had, they have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl; and (9) produce each 
document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any other relationship, they have had, 
they have, or they plan to have with Dr. Dahl. The response to the outstanding discovery will be 
essential to expose the facts and illuminate the issues with respect to Defendants' Motion, the 
Court should order them to answer the discovery prior to considering the their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
For the reasons stated in sections I and II above, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a 
Protective Order. Plaintiff has propounded discovery upon Defendants that will serve to expose the 
facts and illuminate the issues of the case. Specifically, Plaintiff has propounded the following 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents upon Defendants: 
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INTERROGATORY NO, 1: Identify any communications that you had with Mrs. Dahl while 
you acted as her counsel. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the 
communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify any communications that you had with other persons while 
you acted as her legal counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the 
communication, the place the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the 
communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify any communications that you have had with Rosemond 
Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place 
the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you have had with Dr. Dahl. 
Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the communication took place, the people 
present, and the subject matter of the communication 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted that 
have involved Rosemond Blakelock. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or consulted in 
that relate to Dr. Charles Dahl. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you 
entered into the "Stipulation" without Mrs. Dahl's knowledge or consent. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify the basis and the reasons that you recommended to Mrs. 
Dahl to sign up for anger management and parenting classes. 
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INTERROGATORY NO, 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you 
told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2, 2006 hearing would be continued, she would not need to 
appear. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to put 
Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2, 2006 hearing, as asserted in 
paragraph 40 of your Answer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. Dahl 
violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's counsel.. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are 
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages are a 
result of her own actions. „ 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages were 
caused by intervening causes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages were 
the product of circumstances over which you had no control. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are 
barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed to 
mitigate her damages. 
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PROPOSED BY: 
Ben W. Liebennan (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C. 
1390 South 1100 East, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Tel: (801) 906-5551 
Fax:(800)886-3653 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; 
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah 
professional corporation; 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF COURT REGARDING 
PENDING MOTIONS 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on five pending motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for 
a Protective Order; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Scheduling Order; (3) Plaintiffs Motion for 
Rule 56(f) Continuance; (4) Defendants' Motion to Strike; and (5) Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of said motions, based upon the briefs, argument of 
counsel, and the entire record in this case, and as stated in further detail on the record at the 
August 7, 2008 hearing, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order is GRANTED. Defendants need not 
respond to written discovery served by Plaintiff on the date of the fact discovery 
cut-off. All discovery was to be completed by that date, and thus because 
responses would have been due after the fact discovery cut-off, requests are 
untimely. 
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Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Scheduling Order is GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART. To the extent this motion requested modification of the fact 
discovery deadline, it is denied for failure to show good cause. To the extent it 
requested modification of the expert discovery deadline, the motion is granted. 
The expert discovery deadlines are reset as follows: 
Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports: 
Defendants' Expert Disclosures and Reports: 
Rebuttal Reports: 
Expert Deposition Deadline: 
September 8, 2008 
October 6, 2008 
October 20, 2008 
November 7, 2008 




Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Exhibits 5 and 6 to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment are stricken pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
Defendants ' Motion for Summary Judgi^w^l^t^kenoJa3%. advisement. 
^M^0^^M^ 
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Agreed as to form: 
For the Plaintiff/ 
nstensen 
Brennan Moss 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
For the Defendants: 
^r-Heberman 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2008,1 sent a copy of ORDER OF 
COURT REGARDING PENDING MOTIONS to the following person(s) as indicated 
below. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Steve Christensen H3 U.S. Mail 
Brennan Moss O Overnight Mail 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC • Fax 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 • Electronic Mail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 D Hand Delivery 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Brennaa H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
HiRscm CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION 




BRIAN C, HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants, 
— — • • — — — • = • » « » « 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
REPORT 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff Kim Dahl does hereby submit the following expert witness report: 
1) Martin Olsen, 8142 S State Street, Midvale, Utah 84047, 801-255-8067. 
a) The witness will testify as to the standard of care owed to a client by an attorney engaged 
in private family law practice. 
b) The witness is expected to give an opinion that Plaintiff was damaged, the causation of 
the damages, and the extent of the damages in this case. He will also testify that the Defendant 
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failed to meet its professional duty of care. He may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence 
asserted by the Defendants, 
c) The witaess' opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery, the testimony of the parties, and his knowledge of the accepted standards of care 
among private practitioners of family law in the state of Utah. 
d) The witness is an attorney who has engaged in the private practice of family law in the 
state of Utah for seventeen (17) years. 
e) The witness will charge $225.00 an hour for his study and $225.00 an hour for his 
testimony. 
f) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c.v. 
2) Clark Nielsen, 215 S State Street, Suite 650, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 801-413-1600. 
a) The witaess will testify as to the standard of care owed to a client by an attorney engaged 
in private family law practice. 
b) The witness is expected to give an Opinion that Plaintiff was damaged, the causation of 
the damages, and the extent of the damages in this case. He will also testify that the Defendant 
failed to meet its professional duty of care. He may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence 
asserted by the Defendants, 
c) The witaess' opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery, the testimony of the parties, and hi$ knowledge of the accepted standards of care 
among private practitioners of family law in the state of Utah. 
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d) The witness is an attorney who has engaged in the private practice of family law in the 
state of Utah for thirty two (32) years. 
e) The witness will charge $225.00 an hour for his study and $225,00 an hour for Ms 
testimony. 
f) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c.v. 
3) JohnBrough, Clift Building, Suite 310,10W. Broadway Salt Lake City, UT 84101.. 
a) The witness will testify as to the amount of all damages suffered by plaintiff in this case. 
He may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
b) The witness' opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery, the testimony of the parties, and his knowledge of accounting practices. 
c) The witness is expected to testify as to the amount and extent of economic damages 
suffered by the Plaintiff in this case, as well as the methods for computation of these damages, 
d) The witness i s an economic and valuation expert who has testified previou$ly as an expert 
witness. 
e) The witness will charge $240.00 an hour for his study and preparation and $240.00 for 
his testimony, 
f) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c,v. 
4) Mohammad Alsolaimain, M.D., 1055 N. 500 W. Prove, UT 84604, (801) 374-1268. 
a) The witness will testify as to the causation of physical injuries suffered by the Plaintiff in 
this case. He may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
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b) The witness' opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery, the testimony of the parties, his observation and treatment of Plaintiff, and his 
knowledge of medicine. 
c) The witness is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state of Utah 
d) The witness' fees for testimony and study are currently unknown. 
e) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c.v. 
5) Lisa Stout, MIX, 181 E. 5600 S., Suite 130Murray, UT 84107, (801) 266-8664. 
a) The witness will testify as to the causation of physical injuries suffered by the Plaintiff in 
this case. She may also offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
b) The witness* opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery* the testimony of the parties, her observation and treatment of Plaintiff, and her 
knowledge of medicine. 
c) The witness is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state of Utah. 
d) The witness' fees for testimony and study are cuixently unknown. 
e) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c.v. 
6) Alan Jeffery, MJD„ M.D., 1055 N, 500 W. Provo, UT 84604, (801) 374-1268. 
a) The witness will testify as to the causation of physical injuries suffered by the Plaintiff in 
this case. He may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
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b) The witness' opinions will be based upon a review of all information obtained through 
discovery, flic testimony of the parties, his observation and treatment of Plaintiff, and his 
knowledge of medicine. 
c) The witness is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state of Utah. 
d) The witness' fees for testimony and study axe currently unknown, 
e) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his c.v, 
*i 
DATED this % day of September, 2008. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
/ j ' /j 
// 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNANH.MOSS 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606) 
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Kim Dahl 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, and hereby 
submits her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports, 
as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Trial has not been set in this matter. See Case Docket. 
A pretrial has not been requested or scheduled in this matter. 
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) 
3. The scheduling order requires Plaintiffs expert disclosures by September 8, 2008. 
4. Plaintiff produced her expert witness report on or about September 8, 2008. See 
Exhibit A to the Motion to Strike. 
5. On or about September 10, 2008, counsel for Defendants sent a letter to counsel 
for Plaintiff by email stating that he felt the expert reports were deficient under U.R.C.P. 
26(a)(3)(B), and requesting supplementation of the reports by Friday, September 12, 2008, two 
(2) days later. See Exhibit B to the Motion to Strike. 
6. On Monday, September 15,2008, three (3) business days after the letter from 
counsel for Defendants was sent, Mr. Christensen, counsel for Plaintiff, corresponded with 
counsel for Defendants regarding supplementation of the expert reports. See the Affidavit of 
Steve S. Christensen in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Disclosures and 
Reports (the "Christensen Affidavit"), 1f 4. Mr. Christensen agreed to supplement the expert 
reports as requested. Id. 
7. Counsel for Defendants indicated that it was too late and that he had already filed 
the instant motion. Id. at ]f 5. Counsel for Defendants further indicated that he would not grant 
Plaintiff any time to supplement the expert reports even though Plaintiff proposed a stipulation to 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Identify all times in which you have been covered by malpractice 
insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which you were covered, and the name of the malpractice 
carrier. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Produce all documents relating to your representation of Kim Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Produce all documents relating to every agreement, document, or other 
writing that was executed by the parties, or either of them, to engage the employment of Brian C. 
Harrison or Brian C. Harrison, P.C. for Kim Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Produce all documents relating to your claim that you had authority to 
represent Mrs. Dahl in case number 064402232. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl consented to your 
entry into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl authorized you to 
your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Produce all documents, notes, memoranda, or other writings relating to case 
number 064402232. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and Dr. 
Charles Dahl, or her claim. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and 
Rosemond Blakelock, or her agent, which related to Mrs. Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Produce all documents relating to any conversations between you and Mrs. 
Dahl. 
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REQUEST NO. 10; Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to Mrs. 
Dahl for your legal counsel and representation. 
REQUEST NO. 11; Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients against 
parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
REQUEST NO. 12; Produce all the files that relate to your answer to interrogatory number 6 
above. 
REQUEST NO. 13; Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have had, you 
have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 14; Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any 
other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl. 
REQUEST NO. 15; Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory number 10. 
Answers to the above discovery will facilitate a fair trial by the full disclosure of all relevant 
testimony and evidence. Therefore, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Scheduling 
Order, Motion for Further Discovery, and deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order. 
DATED this / Z day of May, 2008. 
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENNAN H. MOSS 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's Motion is Premature As Defendants Failed To Attempt To 
Resolve This Matter In Good Faith 
As noted by Defendants, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
the disclosure of expert witness reports, and states: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide 
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly 
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and 
signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be 
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding 
four years. 
U.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
The Defendants' Motion to Strike purports to be based on U.R.C.P. 37(f). However, the 
remedy sought by the pleading derives from U.R.C.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(C). Rule 37(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall not admit witnesses, documents, or other 
materials which have not been disclosed in accordance with Rule 26(a). The Rule also permits 
the court to impose additional sanctions "upon motion" and as "authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2)," which sanctions include striking of pleadings, dismissal of actions, entry of default, 
finding of contempt, and payment of attorneys fees. U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2). Rule 37(f) is primarily 
drafted to describe the court's ability to limit evidence. However, no evidence is being offered at 
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this time. Rule 37(f) also allows for a motion for sanctions through Rule 37(b)(2). However, 
Rule 37(b)(2) disclosure sanctions are appropriately reserved for when a party has not complied 
with a court order compelling disclosure obtained through Rule 37(a). See id. The court should 
require Defendant to comply with Rule 37(b) to the extent that Defendants are seeking to claim 
37(b)(2) sanctions through Rule 37(f). 
In turn Rule 37(b)(2) incorporates Rule 37(a)(2) which requires that a moving party 
certify good faith attempts to resolve the dispute prior to seeking court involvement. Because 
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has made a good faith effort to secure further 
disclosure without court action in accordance with U.R.C.P. Rule 37(a)(2)(A), he should not be 
able to seek sanctions by motion.. Thus, Defendants' motion to strike is both premature and 
inappropriate. 
This approach to the discovery rules would be consistent with the court's policy to 
encourage good faith cooperation between the parties during discovery, Rule 37(a)(2)(A) 
mandates that a movant seeking an order to compel discovery "include a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party . . . in an effort to secure 
the disclosure without court action." 
Defendants have not acted in good faith in attempting to resolve this issue without 
resorting to judicial intervention. Indeed, Defendants made only a token effort to address their 
concern before filing the instant motion. It is undisputed that Defendants gave Plaintiff only two 
business days to respond to the request for supplementation. See Exhibit A to the Christensen 
Affidavit. When contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, counsel for Defendants indicated that the 
4 
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instant motion had already been mailed for filing, suggesting that he had prepared the motion 
without even waiting to see if Plaintiff would respond. Moreover, when Plaintiff agreed to 
comply with the request for supplementation, counsel for Defendants would not agree and chose 
instead to continue pursuing their motion. 
2. The Motion To Strike Fails Due To Plaintiffs Compliance, A Lack Of Fault And A 
Lack Of Prejudice 
Defendants' Motion to Strike fails for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs expert 
disclosures substantially complied with the Rules. Second, Defendants have not reasonably 
attempted to resolve this matter prior to filing their Motion to Strike. Third, Defendants have 
suffered absolutely no prejudice as a result of Plaintiff s expert disclosures and reports, and will 
not suffer any prejudice if the Court grants Plaintiff more time to revise said reports. For the 
foregoing reasons, which are set forth more fully below, the Court should deny Defendants' 
Motion to Strike, or in the alternative, provide Plaintiff with additional time to revise her expert. 
reports. 
a. Plaintiffs Expert Reports Substantially Complied With Rule 26(a)(3)(B) 
As noted above, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) requires an expert reports to disclose (i) the subject 
matter of the on which the expert is expected to testify; (ii) the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; 9iii) a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; (iv) the qualifications of the witness; (v) the compensation to be paid; and (vi) a listing 
of other cases in which the witness has testified. U.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
5 
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Plaintiffs expert witness reports substantially complied with all of the foregoing 
elements. See Exhibit A to the Motion to Strike. Indeed, the expert reports specifically address 
each of the foregoing categories. Despite Defendants' argument that the reports are "grossly 
deficient," at worst the reports provide sufficient information to allow Defendant to determine 
the purpose of the experts, whether a deposition will be required, whether rebuttal experts will be 
required, etc. 
Moreover, Plaintiff readily agreed to supplement the reports but was not given time from 
the Defendants to do so. See the Christensen Affidavit, | | 4-6. 
b. Plaintiff Has Not Acted With Willfulness, Bad Faith Or Fault 
In addition, the case law of this jurisdiction requires that before issuing discovery 
sanctions the Court first find that Plaintiff has acted in willful disobedience to an order, acted in 
bad faith or fault, or otherwise demonstrated persistent dilatory tactics in the litigation. 
Coxey, 112P.3dat 1246. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining discovery sanctions. Hales v. Oldroyd, 
999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000). However, "[bjefore the court imposes discovery sanctions 
under rule 37, it must find on the part of the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or fault, 
or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Coxey v. Fraternal Order of the 
Eagles, Aerie 2742, 112 P.3d 1244, 1246 (Utah 2005); citing Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 
938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997), W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 568 P.2d at 738; see also Hales v. 
Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000); Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 
1997). 
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There is no evidence of bad faith, willfulness, fault or persistent dilatory tactics before 
the Court. Defendants have not even made allegations as to fault. Accordingly, the Motion to 
Strike should be denied. 
c. Defendants Are Not Prejudiced By Allowing Plaintiff To Supplement 
Rule 37(f) governs discovery sanctions related to the failure to disclose and states: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by 
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required 
by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or 
other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision 
(b)(2). 
U.R.C.P. 37(f). Rule 37(f) specifically states that failure to disclose is grounds for striking a 
witness "unless the failure to disclose is harmless ..." U.R.C.P. 37(f). Here, the failure to 
disclose is harmless and does not prejudice Defendants in any way. 
Notably, there was a disclosure and expert reports were provided. As noted above, the 
reports were arguably and demonstrably substantially compliant with Rule 26(a)(3)(B). Even if 
they were not sufficient, Defendants have not suffered any harm as a result, and Plaintiff should 
be granted the opportunity to supplement. 
Indeed, in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the decision of a trial court to allow an expert witness to testify at trial that was not 
disclosed until five days before trial, and no expert report was provided until the day before trial. 
The Christenseon Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony because 
"the expert was made available to the [opposing party] either for an informal interview or for a 
7 
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deposition" and there was therefore no prejudice resulting from the untimely 6xpert disclosures. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1377-78. 
Importantly, no trial has been set in instant case. Nor has the deadline for discovery of 
expert witnesses concluded. Accordingly, Defendants are not prejudiced in the slightest by 
Plaintiffs expert disclosures. This is especially true given that Plaintiff has agreed to 
supplement to disclosures. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court 
deny the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports. In the alternative, if the 
Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike, Plaintiff hereby requests that she be granted 
sufficient time to revise her expert reports. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2008., 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Steve/$. Christensen 
Jeffrey J. Steele 
Brennan H. Moss 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Steve S. Chxistensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Matthew B. Anderson (U.S.B. No 9877) 
Steven A. Clayton (U.S.B. No. 10448) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO ALLOW TESTIMONY OF 
EXPERT WITNESSES AT TRIAL 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff, by and through her Counsel of Record, respectfully moves this Court to Allow 
Testimony of Her Expert Witnesses at Trial The grounds for this Motion, as more fully set forth 
in an accompanying memorandum, filed concurrently herewith, is that Plaintiff has produced the 
report of Martin Olsen to Defendant prior to trial setting and there is sufficient time to depose 
this witness. Further, the Plaintiff only had one month in which to prepare an expert witness 
report from the time of the court's order on August 7, 2008 extending the scheduling order. As 
there has not yet been a trial date set, no prejudice will result to the Defendants should the Court 
allow an extension of time. 
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i DATED this V> aay of January, 2009. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
Steve S. Christensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. I I H O \ S T W C 1 COURT 
pROVOPr.PA.HlHF-HT/ 
WWJMI25 P^3M 
Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Matthew B. Anderson (U.S.B. No. 9877) 
Steven A. Clayton (U.S.B. No. 10448) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, §uite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Kim Dahl 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C. 
HARRISON, P.C. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO ALLOW 
TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
AT TRIAL 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Laycock 
Plaintiff, by and through her Counsel of Record, respectfully submits this Memorandum 
in Support of Her Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial. 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8, 2008, the Defendants moved this Court to Strike the Plaintiffs 
Designation of Expert Witnesses and accompanying Expert Witness Reports. This Court later 
granted the Defendants' motion. The Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses and expert 
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witness reports were due on September 8, 2008, pursuant to an amended scheduling order. The 
original scheduling order required submission of the expert witness reports by May 5, 2008. On 
August 7, 2008, the Court granted the Plaintiffs motion for an extension of time to file expert 
witness reports and designations, setting the deadline as September 8, 2008. Plaintiff produced a 
designation of witnesses attached hereto as Exhibit A on September 8, 2008. Plaintiff also 
produce an expert witness report on September 8, 2008. Plaintiff produced a supplemental 
expert witness report on December 12, 2008 for Martin Olsen as requested by opposing counsel, 
attached as Exhibit C hereto. The Court has not yet scheduled a trial date in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant an Extension of Time to File Expert Witness Disclosures 
because no Prejudice Will Result 
Trial Court's have broad discretion in discovery matters, including the extension of 
deadlines. This discretion, however, must by guided by, and comply with the general policies 
and purposes underlying discovery. The purpose of discovery is to expose the facts and 
illuminate the issues. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of 
all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."). Utah's discovery 
rules are aimed at "facilitating fair trials with full disclosure of all relevant testimony and 
evidence," Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), and are designed so "the 
court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as 
possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). By extending the time in which the 
Plaintiff may make expert witness disclosures, the Court will allow the parties to gather all 
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) 
relevant facts for the case, and will benefit the court by giving it the information it needs to 
determine the facts and resolve the issues. Accordingly, this Court should exercise its discretion 
in a manner most calculated to lead to a fair trial. 
The central focus of inquiry in this matter is to ensure a fair trial to both parties. 
Accordingly, the Court, when determining whether to allow expert disclosures past deadlines, 
should focus its inquiry on prejudice to the opposing party. If there is little or no prejudice to the 
opposing party from allowing expert witness disclosures, the Court's interest in affording a fair 
trial favors fully exposing facts, evidence, and information that will most accurately resolve the 
parties' dispute. 
Indeed, in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed the decision of a trial court to allow an expert witness to testify at trial that was not 
disclosed until five days before trial, and no expert report was provided until the day before trial. 
The Christenson Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony because 
"the expert was made available to the [opposing party] either for an informal interview or for a 
deposition" and there was therefore no prejudice resulting from the untimely expert disclosures. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1377-78. 
The facts in this case demonstrate that this Court should exercise its discretion to allow 
Plaintiff to provide expert witness testimony at trial. A liability expert, Martin Olsen has 
produced a supplemental report. Further a damage witness, Clark Nielsen is willing to produce a 
supplemental report. The other experts were not retained in the course of litigation and are not 
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required to file further reports unless the court so orders. The court has not ordered reports from 
the experts who were not retained for litigation. 
In this case there has not yet been a trial date set. Accordingly, the Defendants would be 
afforded sufficient time, opportunity, and information to prepare fully for trial In Christenson, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a disclosure as late as 5 days previous to trial was sufficient 
because the opposing party had access informally to the witness and had an opportunity to 
depose the witness. Plaintiff does not anticipate providing expert witness disclosures as late as 5 
days on the eve of trial. In fact, given the current state of litigation, the Defendants would likely 
have months to review expert disclosures, and prepare strategy accordingly. 
The Plaintiff, moreover, has not been dilatory. The Plaintiff was unable to meet the 
original deadline because the underlying action is extremely complex and is believed to comprise 
8 volumes in the court's file. Further, because a Motion for Summary Judgment was pending, it 
was unclear whether the expense of expert review of the file would be useful for the client. If 
this court requires further disclosure, an appropriate amount of time should be permitted for this 
purpose. 
The Plaintiff was unable to prepare expert disclosures upon the second deadline, 
moreover, because it had insufficient time, and was uncertain as to whether it could present these 
disclosures in the first place. Accordingly, it would be both fair and equitable for this Court to 
allow an extension of time in which to file the Plaintiffs expert disclosures. 
CONCLUSION 
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Because no prejudice would result to the Defendant, and because the Plaintiff has not yet 
had a full opportunity to prepare expert disclosures, this Court should allow Plaintiffs experts 
which were designated on September 8, 2008 to testify at trial. 
DATED this Z l ^ y of January, 2009. 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
SteVe S. 
Matthew B. Anderson 
Steven A. Clayton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF H E R MOTION TO ALLOW TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
AT TRIAL was hand delivered on this St 
day of January, 2009, to the following: 
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C. 
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Email: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Proposed by: 
Ben W.Lieberman (#11456) 
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, PLC 
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 505-0585 
Toil-Free Telephone (877) 460-6661 
Toil-Free Fax: (800) 886-3653 
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; 
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALLOW EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL AND 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 070403005 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at 
Trial and on Defendants' related Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. For the reasons set forth 
below and those stated at the March 12, 2009 hearing on these motions, the Court denies 
Plaintiffs motion and grants Defendants' motion for their attorneys' fees and costs. 
APR I 4 2009 
STATEOFUlftH/ 
UTAH COUNTY 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The initial scheduling order in this matter was set by stipulation in early 
November, 2007. It provided, inter alia, a deadline of May 5,2008, for Plaintiff Kim Dahl 
("Plaintiff') to disclose any experts. 
2. Plaintiffs May 5, 2008 expert disclosure deadline came and went, and Plaintiff 
failed to disclose any expert. 
3. On May 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed motions with the Court for amendment of the 
scheduling order and for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
4. On August 7, 2008, the Court held oral argument on all pending motions, 
including Plaintiffs request to amend the scheduling order. The Court denied Plaintiffs request 
for further time for fact discovery, but it did extend the expert discovery deadlines. It gave 
Plaintiff until September 8, 2008, to serve her expert disclosures and reports. 
5. Despite being granted this extension, Plaintiff failed to make proper expert 
disclosures when the time came to do so. The expert disclosures and reports that she did serve 
were failed utterly by any standards, providing the purported experts' names and little more. 
6. On September 18, 2008, Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, 
P.C. (collectively, "Defendants") moved to strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (the "Motion to Strike"). Plaintiff filed her opposition 
memorandum to the Motion to Strike on October 2, 2008. Defendants filed their reply 
memorandum on October 14, 2008. 
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7. On December 16? 2008, the Court held oral argument on the Motion to Strike. 
The Court granted the motion and found a willful failure on the part of Plaintiff to carry this case 
forward and to obey the orders of the Court. 
8. At the December 16, 2008 hearing, Plaintiff requested more time to prepare 
proper disclosures and reports, which the Court specifically rejected at that time. 
9. The Court ordered Ben W. Lieberman, counsel for Defendants, to prepare a 
written order memorializing the Court's order from the bench. Mr. Lieberman did so, and sent 
the order to Mr. Christensen. Plaintiff objected to the proposed order, but only as to the 
preliminary language regarding how long of an extension Plaintiff had been given by the Court 
on August 7, 2008. Plaintiff did not object to the proposed order's language indicating that the 
motion to strike was granted and the expert disclosures stricken. 
10. Less than six weeks after her expert disclosures were stricken by the Court, 
Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which raises issues materially identical to those already decided 
in the context of the Motion to Strike. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is in 
essence a motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior order striking Plaintiffs expert 
disclosures. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial cites no basis that would 
warrant reconsideration of the prior order on the Motion to Strike. 
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3. The Court finds no basis to grant Plaintiff more time to disclose experts, and thus 
declines to do so. 
4. The Court finds no basis to allow Plaintiff to introduce expert testimony at trial, 
given the fact that Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) clearly and unequivocally requires proper disclosure as a 
condition precedent to admission of evidence. 
5. Because these issues had already been specifically decided six weeks prior, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff s Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is frivolous. 
6. In such cases, the Court has statutory power under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 
to award reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
7. Additionally, Court has the inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney 
fees and costs when it deems appropriate in the interest of justice and equity. 
8. Utilizing these statutory and equitable powers, the Court grants Defendants their 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs Motion to Allow 
Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for recovery of such fees, and costs. 
ORDER OF COURT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated on the record at the March 12, 2009 
hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is 
DENIED, and Defendants5 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED. 
It is further ORDERED that, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff s 
u 
counsel shall pay to Defendants the sum of $ o2 , HS%k lo *£ , which the Court finds is 
' — ^ 1H105 
the amount of Defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs injburred in defending against 
ULuH Lrt, 
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Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for 
recovery of such fees and costs. 
SO ORDERED this [H day of _ , 2009, by: 
[ytdiiJyC^ 
a Ttn&^&O 
Agreed as to form: 
The Honorable Claims. la^ioc]<||?; m \ 
Fourth District C o u r g l l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ 




Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 070403005 
DATE: 6 January 2010 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 3 
This matter came before the court for a two-day bench trial on October 26 and 27, 
2009, which was the first phase in a two-part bifurcated trial. In her complaint, the plaintiff, Kim 
Dahl ("Mrs. Dahl"), brought tliree causes of action based on legal malpractice, asserting that the 
defendants, Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C. ("Mr. Harrison"), breached 
professional, fiduciary, and contractual duties. This first phase of trial was limited to issues 
concerning liability, specifically, breach and causation. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case-in-chief, Mr. Harrison moved for judgment as a 
matter of law. The court heard arguments related to the motion, reserved jurisdiction to rule on 
the motion later, and asked the parties for further briefing on the issue raised—specifically, ' 
whether the plaintiffs failure to present any evidence or expert testimony regarding the standard 
of care in this legal malpractice trial was fatal to the plaintiffs claims. Mr. Harrison then 
presented his case, and the court heard the rest of the evidence and closing arguments. Digi ized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law School, BYU. 
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Having considered the testimony, evidence, arguments presented at trial, and the 
parties' additional briefing related to Mr. Harrison's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the 
court is ready to rule in this matter. For convenience, and because of the overarching issue 
regarding expert testimony, the court combines the findings of fact related to the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and the overall issues from trial. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Mrs. Dahl filed her complaint in this matter on October 11, 2007. 
2. At a hearing on August 7, 2008 the court granted Mrs. Dahl's request for additional 
time to file her expert disclosures and reports. The new deadline established by the court was 
September 8, 2008. 
3. On September 8, 2008 Mrs. Dahl filed her Designation of Expert Witnesses, which 
included the following names (along with addresses and telephone numbers): Martin Olsen, 
Clark Nielsen, John Brough, Mohammad Alsolaimain, M.D., Lisa Stout, M.D., and Alan Jeffery, 
M.D. 
4. On that same date Mrs. Dahl filed her Expert Witness Report. With regard to 
Martin Olsen, she wrote: 
(a) The witness will testify as to the standard of care owed to a client by an 
attorney engaged in private family law practice. 
(b) The witness is expected to give an opinion that Plaintiff was damaged, the 
causation of the damages, and the extent of the damages in this case. He will 
also testify that the Defendant failed to meet its professional duty of care. He 
may offer rebuttal testimony to any evidence asserted by the Defendants. 
(c) The witness' opinions will be based upon a review of all information 
obtained through discovery, the testimony of the parties, and his knowledge of 
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the accepted standards of care among private practitioners of family law in the 
state of Utah. 
(d) The witness is an attorney who has engaged in the private practice of family 
law in the state of Utah for seventeen (17) years. 
(e) The witness will charge $225.00 an hour for his study and $225.00 an hour 
for his testimony. 
(f) Any deposition given by the witness will be produced if not included on his 
c.v. 
5. In the same Expert Witness Report, Mrs. Dahl used exactly the same words to 
describe Clark Nielsen's expert testimony, except that he had practiced for 32 years. No 
additional information was included for either Mr. Olsen or Mr. Nielsen. 
6. In the same Expert Witness Report, Mrs. Dahl listed no other experts who would 
testify regarding (1) the appropriate standard of care owed to a client by an attorney engaged in 
private family law practice, (2) causation, and (3) damages. 
7. Mr. Harrison filed his Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) on September 18, 2008. After briefing was complete, the court 
heard oral arguments on the motion on December 16, 2008. 
8. At the December 16, 2008 hearing the court ruled from the bench, granting the 
Motion to Strike, finding that the disclosures and reports (as quoted above) did not comply with 
the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). 
9. After dealing with Mrs. Dahl's objections to the proposed order, the court signed the 
Order Granting Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports on March 5, 2009. 
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10. In the meantime, on January 23, 2009 Mrs. Dahl had filed her Motion to Allow 
Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial. After briefing was complete, the court heard oral 
arguments on the motion on March 12, 2009. 
11. At the March 12, 2009 hearing the court ruled from the bench, denying the Motion 
to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial, finding that Mrs. Dahl's motion was essentially 
a motion to reconsider the court's prior ruling on the defendants' Motion to Strike. The court 
additionally found (1) that Mrs. Dahl had cited no grounds which justified reconsideration of the 
court's prior ruling on the Motion to Strike, (2) that there was no reason to grant her more time to 
disclose expert witnesses, and (3) that, under Rule 37 and Mrs. Dahl's failure to properly disclose 
her expert witnesses, there was no reason to allow her to introduce expert testimony at trial. 
Finally, the court found that Mrs. Dahl's motion was frivolous and awarded attorney's fees to 
Mr. Harrison. 
12. The court signed the proposed findings, conclusions, and order denying Mrs. 
Dahl's Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial on April 14, 2009. 
13. Pursuant to the court's orders, the trial went forward on October 26-27, 2009 
without any expert testimony from Mrs. Dahl's proposed expert witnesses re: the standard of 
care, causation, and damages.1 
'The court also struck other expert witnesses through the above-mentioned rulings. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY 
After reviewing the testimony of the witnesses at trial and considering the credibility of 
the witnesses, the court finds that the testimony of the defendants' witnesses is generally more 
credible, consistent, and trustworthy. The court finds the testimony of Samantha Stokes to be 
impartial, credible, and extremely helpful in assessing Mrs. Dahl's and Mr. Harrison's 
credibility. Ms. Stokes' testimony was consistent with Exhibit I, her handwritten notes to Mr. 
Harrison (as dictated by Mrs. Dahl), which were written at 4:10 p.m. on November 2, 2006, after 
the hearing before Commissioner Patton. 
These handwritten notes contradict Mrs. Dahl's testimony that, after talking to Mr. 
Harrison after the November 2, 2006 hearing, she decided to fire him. The court is persuaded 
that Mrs. Dahl was content with Mr. Harrison's efforts at that hearing and that she wanted Mr. 
Harrison to continue as her attorney—even asking him to work on her case for 4-5 hours per day. 
Therefore, the following findings of fact reflect the court's findings that Ms. Stokes' and Mr. 
Harrison's memories were more accurate than Mrs. Dahl's memory and that they were more 
credible witnesses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action for legal malpractice arises from an underlying divorce action between 
Dr. Charles Dahl ("Dr. Dahl") and Mrs. Dahl, which Dr. Dahl filed on October 24, 2006. The 
Dahls have two children, a daughter (now age 14) and a son (now age 9). The divorce action is 
entitled Dahl v. Dahl, case no. 064402232. 
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2. Along with the divorce petition, Dr. Dahl filed a motion for an ex parte temporary 
restraining order ("TRO"), alleging that Mrs. Dahl was putting the Dahls' young children in 
danger and requesting exclusive temporary custody. In support thereof, Dr. Dahl filed a 65-
paragraph affidavit including allegations that Mrs. Dahl was engaging in physical and emotional 
abuse of the children. 
3. In his affidavit, Dr. Dahl made many allegations about Mrs. DahPs treatment of the 
children. The following list is representative of his allegations: 
a. On October 11, 2006 Mrs. Dahl said to her daughter, "Pick this stuff up, I am not 
your damn nigger." 
b. Previous to that date, Mrs. Dahl had stated to her daughter that she would "cram 
your homework up your damn ass." 
c. Mrs. Dahl had given her daughter a prescription medication (amitriptylline) for 
restless leg syndrome. This medication had never been prescribed for the daughter, nor had any 
doctor ever diagnosed the daughter with restless leg syndrome. Mrs. Dahl, when confronted by 
Dr. Dahl, had refused to stop giving her daughter the medication. Mrs. Dahl also increased or 
changed her daughter's various medications without a doctor's order. 
d. The Dahls' daughter reacted to her mother's verbal abuse on July 24, 2006 by 
stating that she wanted to kill herself. 
e. Mrs. Dahl had also stated that she wanted to kill herself during that same episode. 
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f. On December 25,2005 Mrs. Dahl's anger at Dr. Dahl resulted in her repeated use of 
foul language in front of the children and her destruction of several drinking glasses, a glass 
clock, and a computer keyboard. 
g. On March 16, 2006 Mrs. Dahl had called their daughter a "shithead and a jerk," 
which was followed by Mrs. Dahl slapping the child in the face. Their son also reported to Dr. 
Dahl that he had seen Mrs. Dahl slap his sister 8 times. 
h. Dr. Dahl claimed that his wife's "abuse and outbursts are increasing in number and 
intensity and [he was] afraid for the safety and welfare of [their] children." 
I. Mrs. Dahl required her son to sleep in the same bed with her in a bedroom separate 
from where Dr. Dahl slept. 
j . Their daughter's psychiatrist had advised Dr. Dahl to remove the Dahls' daughter 
from Mrs. Dahl's presence because the present circumstances were harming the daughter. 
4. Dr. Dahl also filed an order to show cause regarding temporary physical custody, 
supervised visitation, temporary use and possession of the marital home, restraint of Mrs. Dahl 
regarding removal of the children from school, and appointment of a custody evaluator. The 
same affidavit supported his order to show cause. 
5. The TRO motion and the order to show cause were granted, and on October 24, 
2006 Judge James R. Taylor issued the Ex Parte Restraining Order restraining Mrs. Dahl from 
any contact with the children. A hearing on the ex parte order and the order to show cause was 
set for November 2, 2006 (the "November 2 hearing") before Commissioner Tom Patton of the 
Fourth District Court. The ex parte order specifically stated: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(a) [Mrs. Dahl is] hereby restrained from removing the minor children from the 
temporary care, custody and control of the Petitioner. 
(b) [Mrs. Dahl is] hereby restrained from removing either minor child from 
his/her school, for any reason and restrained from contacting the minor children 
at his/her school. 
6. Mrs. Dahl was served with the complaint, TRO, order to show cause and other 
documents on Wednesday, October 25, 2006. She first met with and retained Mr. Harrison to 
represent her in the divorce and custody proceedings on Thursday, October 26, 2006. She had 
already been served with the above-mentioned documents. Mrs. Dahl paid Mr. Harrison $5,000 
as a retainer and signed a retainer agreement. No copy of the retainer agreement was produced 
during discovery or during trial. 
7. Mr. Harrison graduated from the law school at Brigham Young University in 1976 
and has been practicing law since that same year. His practice now consists of approximately 
50% domestic law. About 80% of his domestic practice clients are females. 
8. At the initial appointment, Mr. Harrison and Mrs. Dahl discussed the allegations 
made by Dr. Dahl in his affidavit, her admission that she had occasionally used bad language 
with the children, and that she had struck the children. She told Mr. Harrison that when she 
struck the children they had "deserved it." She admitted that she had made the statement found 
in paragraph 8 of the affidavit: 'Tick this stuff up, I am not your damn nigger." He advised her 
that this behavior had to stop and recommended that she enroll in anger management classes and 
parenting classes to improve her position in the custody case. 
9. Mrs. Dahl and Mr. Harrison also discussed the following information: the children's 
dates of birth, their ages, the date of the marriage, the parties' assets (real and personal property), Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter L w Library, J. Reub n Cl rk Law Schoo , BYU. 
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medical insurance, pension and retirement funds, possible child support and alimony amounts, 
and the documents that had been filed by Dr. Dahl. 
10. Mr. Harrison advised Mrs. Dahl that he wanted to continue the November 2 
hearing, so that she could enroll in the classes he had recommended and so that he could be better 
prepared for the hearing. Mrs. Dahl agreed to this plan. She viewed Mr. Harrison as an expert, 
had retained him to get her children back, and intended to follow his advice in order to 
accomplish that goal. 
11. After the appointment ended, Mr. Harrison studied Dr. Dahl's affidavit in order to 
formulate a plan for Mrs. Dahl's defense against her husband's claims. He concluded that Mrs. 
Dahl would never get the children back into her custody unless she changed her behavior. Based 
upon his years of experience in representing female divorce clients, Mr. Harrison believed that 
Commissioner Patton and the judges at the Fourth District Court would not give the children to 
Mrs. Dahl under these circumstances. He wanted time to rehabilitate Mrs. Dahl through the 
classes he had suggested. He believed that, through the classes, Mrs. Dahl would get the children 
back, especially since she had been a full-time stay-at-home mother and she claimed that Dr. 
Dahl was a workaholic. 
12. Mr. Harrison spoke with Rose Blakelock ("Ms. Blakelock"), Dr. Dahl's attorney, 
by telephone on that same date, informing her that he desired to continue the November 2 
hearing. They also discussed the possibility of "fashioning" a temporary agreement at the 
November 2 hearing, but did not discuss any terms. 
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13. Mr. Harrison also met with Mrs. Dahl on Friday, October 27, 2006. Among other 
topics, he asked her if she had made arrangements to take the classes; she responded that she had 
made some initial calls in that regard. 
14. He met again with Mrs. Dahl on Monday, October 30, 2006. On that date she 
brought him a suitcase full of financial documents, including tax returns and other financial 
records. He talked to her regarding retaining James Blaylock as an accountant to work with them 
on the case. He believes that he had Mrs. Dahl take the suitcase of documents to Mr. Blaylock; 
he does not remember taking the suitcase to Mr. Blaylock himself. 
15. During a subsequent meeting on October 31, 2006, Mr. Harrison also spoke with 
Mrs. Dahl about Ms. Blakelock's acquiescence to the continuance of the November 2 hearing. 
They also discussed leaving temporary custody with Dr. Dahl, leaving the children in the marital 
home, and mutual restraint by the parties regarding disparaging remarks. Mr. Harrison also 
reminded Mrs. Dahl how important it was to rehabilitate herself regarding her wrongful conduct 
with the children and that she needed to change for the benefit of the children. Mrs. Dahl did not 
object to the proposed terms of the stipulation for the November 2 hearing. She also understood 
that she needed to change her conduct with the children. She understood that this was a 
temporary stipulation which would give her time to enroll in her classes, give Mr. Harrison time 
to prepare, and would continue the hearing for just two weeks. Mrs. Dahl agreed that this course 
of action was wise. Mr. Harrison and Ms. Blakelock were still discussing issues regarding 
supervised visitation, phone contact with the children, and the administration of the children's 
medications by Dr. Dahl. igitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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16. During that same meeting, Mr. Harrison also informed Mrs. Dahl that there would 
be additional legal fees and that she needed to bring in more money. She brought in $7,000, part 
of which was refunded later. 
17. On Tuesday, October 31, 2006 Mr. Harrison spoke with Ms. Blakelock again. 
They discussed Mr. Harrison's desire for a continuance, as well as the following: temporary 
custody with Dr. Dahl, temporary possession of the marital home by Dr. Dahl, temporary 
supervised visitation, restraining derogatory remarks by the parties about the other party, the 
possibility of Mrs. Dahl taking care of the children in the home while Dr. Dahl was at work, and 
temporary financial support issues. Ms. Blakelock agreed that she would try to get a support 
check for Mrs. Dahl from her client. 
18. Mr. Harrison also spoke with Mrs. Dahl by telephone on Wednesday, November 1, 
2006 about the proposed stipulation and its various elements. He explained that this was the 
stipulation that he intended to enter into at the November 2 hearing. This conversation lasted 
about 15-20 minutes. He told Mrs. Dahl that she did not have to be present at the hearing and 
that he could act on her behalf without her presence. She did not want to come to the hearing; he 
told her that the next hearing would be the important hearing for her to attend. Mrs. Dahl was 
happy that he was going to try to get some additional provisions for her benefit. 
19. On November 1, 2006 Mr. Harrison sent a $3,000 retainer to Mr. Blaylock, the 
accountant. 
20. On Thursday, November 2, 2006 Mr. Harrison arrived early for the hearing. He 
met with Ms. Blakelock, who brought with her a typed stipulation, to which Mr. Harrison and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ms. Blakelock added additional language regarding visitation, telephone contact, and the 
administration of the children's medications. The handwriting on the documents (other than the 
signatures) is Ms. Blakelock's writing. The two attorneys signed the Stipulation and presented it 
to Commissioner Patton for his approval. 
21. Among other provisions, the Stipulation included the following language: 
1. Petitioner recognizes that the Respondent needs additional time to prepare for 
any hearings regarding temporary custody. 
2. Therefore, the parties agree that the Petitioner shall be awarded the temporary 
physical custody of the minor children. The Respondent has not yet answered 
the Complaint nor the Affidavit of the Petitioner regarding his request for 
temporary custody and therefore, by making this agreement, neither party is 
relinquishing his/her claims regarding the issue of custody during the pendency 
of the proceedings. 
3. Without an admission of any of the allegations in the Petitioner's Complaint 
or Affidavit, the parties agree that Respondent shall be awarded supervised 
visitation with the parties' minor children . . . 
7a. The Respondent shall be entitled to visit the minor children in the marital 
home from the time school is out until Petitioner returns home. Respondent 
shall see the children every other Saturday and Sunday from 9AM-5PM . . . 
22. There was no language in the Stipulation which referred to the TRO or to a 
continuance of the TRO. 
23. At that hearing Commissioner Patton noted that he had read through all of the 
documents filed by Dr. Dahl and that this was a matter that could not have been heard in the 15 
minutes that had been scheduled that day. The hearing would have taken much more time, in his 
estimation. He discussed with the attorneys the probable need for more than 15 minutes for the 
next hearing and urged the attorneys to set the next hearing for an afternoon calendar (3:00 p.m.) 
"so that we have enough time to give this the proper consideration." Ms. Blakelock responded Digitized by the Howard W. Hun er Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that she and Mr. Harrison understood that "there's nothing going to be simple about this case, 
either the finances or the custody . . . And that's the reason that we—it's reasonable for Mr. 
Harrison to be allowed to prepare." The parties did not schedule the next hearing at that time. 
24. Commissioner Patton and Judge Anthony Schofield (through a stamped signature) 
signed the subsequent order on November 7, 2006. Mr. Harrison also signed that order, 
approving it as to form. The order included the terms of the Stipulation without variation. 
25. Immediately after the conclusion of the November 2 hearing, Mr. Harrison called 
Mrs. Dahl from either the courthouse or his office and reported to her what had happened at the 
hearing. He went through each of the paragraphs of the Stipulation and explained them to Mrs. 
Dahl. She did not express any opposition to the Stipulation he had entered on her behalf. 
26. Mrs. Dahl agreed that supervised visitation was a good idea, in that it would 
protect her from further allegations. She did not object to having Dr. Dahl's brother act as the 
supervisor; she thought that he would be good and reasonable. She understood that (1) this 
Stipulation would give Mr. Harrison the time to prepare for a future hearing, (2) that she was 
giving up nothing by agreeing to these terms, (3) that this Stipulation was only temporary, and (4) 
the future hearing would determine custody and the other provisions on a longer-termed basis. 
27. Mrs. Dahl also approved of the paragraph that allowed her to be in the marital 
home from the time school was out until Dr. Dahl returned home from work. She also did not 
object to Dr. Dahl administering the medications to the children. 
28. During that conversation, Mr. Harrison told Mrs. Dahl to immediately vacate the 
marital home. She understood and did not oppose that provision of the Stipulation. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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29. Mr. Harrison's practice was to file a counter-affidavit in response to the opposing 
party's affidavit. That is what he probably would have done, had he continued to representors. 
Dahl. Mr. Harrison believed that he could have gone forward with the hearing on November 2, 
2006, but that it was much to Mrs. Dahl's benefit to take the recommended classes and "cure her 
bad acts" so that she could get temporary custody of her children. He also believed that there 
would have been a benefit in allowing Mr. Blaylock 2-3 weeks to prepare a financial analysis of 
the parties' marital estate. 
30. At about 4:00 p.m. on November 2,2006 Mrs. Dahl dropped off more documents 
(letters from friends about her fitness as a mother) for Mr. Harrison. She spoke to Samantha 
Stokes, who was the receptionist at the office building in which Mr. Harrison shared/rented 
office space. Ms. Stokes is not paid directly by Mr. Harrison. 
31. At Mrs. Dahl's direction, Ms. Stokes wrote Mr. Harrison the following note (on 
three post-it-notes): 
Brian, 
Kim brought these in-their documents to prove she is a fit mother—and she'll 
continue to bring documentation in to prove so—so please don't ask her what 
is this (?) She also wants to know if your still considering taking her on full 
time ~ she would like a $ figure of how much it would cost her! She is very 
serious about this! She brought these in about 4:10 p.m. on 11/2/2006 if you 
have questions on what I wrote please let me know 
~ Samantha 
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Didn't understand—thought after they were married it was "theirs" so—she will 
have to pay her husband back—this $4,000 will go towards the $5500.00 ~ She 
wants to enter into a contract where you guarantee 4-5 hrs a da^ on her case.2 
32. Mrs. Dahl stood over Ms. Stokes as she wrote the note to Mr. Harrison and even 
instructed Ms. Stokes to double-underline certain words, as seen above. Ms. Stokes did not find 
that Mrs. Dahl seemed upset about anything that had happened earlier that day; Mrs. Dahl was 
only frustrated that Mr. Harrison would not take her case full-time. Mrs. Dahl brought up the 
topic of full-time representation each time she came into the office. 
33. On November 2, 2006 Ms. Blakelock wrote a check for $4,000 from her trust 
account to Mrs. Dahl. The "memo" line indicates that it was for "Nov. support." According to 
Ms. Blakelock's letter to Mr. Harrison (dated that same date), she was going to have this check 
hand-delivered to Mr. Harrison's office. This is, apparently, the check that Mrs. Dahl did not 
take with her, according to the note from Ms. Stokes. Mr. Harrison mailed the $4,000 check to 
Mrs. Dahl on November 9, 2006. 
34. Mr. Harrison also spoke with Mrs. Dahl on Friday, November 3,2006. They 
discussed visitation for the weekend. He reviewed each of the paragraphs of the Stipulation with 
her. 
35. On Monday, November 6, 2006 Mr. Harrison spoke with Mrs. Dahl. She did not 
advise him that there had been any problems with Dr. Dahl and the children over the weekend. 
2The court has copied Ms. Stokes' notes without correction of spelling and punctuation 
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He later spoke with Ms. Blakelock about the weekend visitation, which Ms. Blakelock claimed 
had not gone very well. 
36. On Tuesday, November 7, 2006 Mr. Harrison also spoke with Mrs. Dahl about her 
counseling and the proposed classes and reviewed the file. 
37. On Wednesday, November 8, 2006 Ms. Blakelock faxed Mr. Harrison a letter 
advising him—among other things—that she would be getting a date for the next hearing. The 
two attorneys phoned the commissioner's office together and obtained a hearing date, November 
16, 2006. This was earlier than Mr. Harrison had planned for the next hearing, but Ms. 
Blakelock's threat of another restraining order gave him no choice but to move the date up. 
38. On November 8, 2006 Mr. Harrison also received from Ms. Blakelock a new 
affidavit from Dr. Dahl, in which Dr. Dahl explained his version of the events of the weekend 
and alleged that Mrs. Dahl had violated the terms of the Stipulation. 
39. Mr. Harrison spoke with Mrs. Dahl about the new affidavit. Mrs. Dahl did not 
dispute the allegations, and she did not appear to believe that they were serious or problematic. 
Mr. Harrison concluded at that time that Mrs. Dahl was an unmanageable client, in that she had 
violated the terms of the Stipulation reached by the parties and their attorneys. 
40. By November 9, 2006 Mr. Harrison and Mrs. Dahl had mutually agreed that their 
attorney/client relationship was at an end. Mr. Harrison signed his Withdrawal of Counsel on 
that same date, but did not file it until November 17, 2006. 
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41. On October 9 or 10, 2006 Mr. Harrison received a call from Rodney Parker, who 
later entered his appearance on behalf of Mrs. Dahl and appeared at the November 16, 2006 
hearing. 
42. At the November 16, 2006 hearing, Ms. Blakelock attempted to address Dr. 
Dahl's request to amend the TRO, while Mr. Parker sought to set the Stipulation aside. 
However, due to Mrs. Dahl's untimely service of evidence essential to the issue, Commissioner 
Patton declined to address the validity of the Stipulation, nor did he address the amendment of 
the TRO. He informed the parties that the hearing would need to be continued so that both sides 
would have a fair opportunity to prepare and present their positions. The focus of the hearing 
quickly shifted to the terms of visitation and the identity of the third-party supervisor. 
43. Mr. Parker argued during the November 16 hearing that supervision of Mrs. Dahl's 
visits with her children was unwarranted. Commissioner Patton noted that Dr. Dahl's new 
allegations of abuse by Mrs. Dahl were presently just allegations, but he still saw a benefit in 
using ACAFS to supervise visitation. He presumed that the allegations were false, and his intent 
in using ACAFS was to protect Mrs. Dahl from any further allegations. 
44. Because of the allegations of child abuse, Commissioner Patton also appointed a 
guardian ad litem, Kelly Peterson. The commissioner further stated: 
. . .between the last hearing and this hearing, we now have new accusations 
against your client [Mrs. Dahl]. Even though the visitation was supervised, 
I now have new allegations being made against your client. 
And you know what happens if I allow your client unsupervised visitation 
before we come back? Before we get back, and then have a whole new set of 
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new allegations, which then means the next hearing has to be continued 
because Mr. Peterson has to examine those allegations. 
So for purposes of today and the ruling I'm about to make, I'm going to 
assume that the allegations being made are false, because if they are false, I 
must protect your client from further false allegations being made. Otherwise, 
I can't hold that hearing.. . 
And for the record, I am not finding - because I - my thin pancake doesn't 
have two sides. And I haven't heard the sides, any of the sides. I'm just 
finding, that if I were to believe [Mrs. Dahl], and all these allegations are false, 
I still have to have a professional, a third-party expert so that she can't be 
accused of anything else falsely. . . 
. . . I'm considering the fact that the allegations have been made, and that they 
are false allegations. And I will not have new false allegations made about 
your client before we get - can even get back. That's what the order is based 
on. It is what it is. 
45. At the conclusion of this hearing, Commissioner Patton scheduled the divorce matter 
for a hearing on the pending issues (including custody and possession of the marital home) for 
December 19,2006. 
46. On November 17, 2006 Mr. Harrison mailed a letter to Mrs. Dahl, which included a 
billing summary and a refund check for $3,746.05. Even at that time, he still used the address of 
the marital home as her mailing address, as she had never provided him with any other address. 
47. On November 17, 2006 Mr. Harrison also filed his Withdrawal of Counsel with the 
court. 
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48. At the December 19, 2006 hearing, which started at 3:21 p.m. and ended at 5:46 
p.m.,3 both parties and the guardian ad litem, Kelly Peterson, had an opportunity to proffer 
testimony regarding custody, visitation, and possession of the marital home before Commissioner 
Patton. Mr. Peterson prefaced his comments to the court by stating, "I think . . . every . . . third-
party professional.. . that I've spoken with that has met her [Mrs. Dahl], and myself included . . . 
believes that there are some fairly significant mental health concerns, we don't know what." He 
then proffered the testimony of Dr. Coates, who was one of the children's psychiatrists, and 
Kaydeen Jensen from ACAFS. He mentioned Dr. Gentry, who was also in the courtroom, but 
did not proffer Dr. Gentry's testimony—apparently relying upon Dr. Gentry's written testimony, 
which had been offered to the court. After proffering their testimony, Mr. Peterson 
recommended to the commissioner that the "current temporary order ought to remain in effect, 
uh, regarding supervision . . . pending the custody evaluation." 
49. Ms. Blakelock next addressed the commissioner, informing him that Dr. Dahl agreed 
with Mr. Peterson's recommendation. Dr. Dahl's attorney addressed further visitation issues, 
addressing the previous proffer from Dr. Coates and Kaydeen Jensen. 
50. Mr. Parker (after a recess and a brief interruption by Mr. Peterson), addressed the 
court, proffering Mrs. Dahl's testimony, as well as testimony from Mrs. Dahl's sister, Stacy 
Tucker, and Claudia Teres. 
3The court takes judicial notice of the docket in the underlying divorce action, which is 
available to the court "in house" and to the public online. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51. As Commissioner Patton made his ruling regarding custody and possession of the 
home, he considered, through the statutory factors, the proffered testimony he had heard. He first 
found that Mrs. Dahl had been the primary caretaker for the minor children. 
52. With regard to the current placement of the children, the commissioner stated: 
Time with parent pending trial or during appeal, well, this has not been 
pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and it has not really been based on 
an evidentiary hearing, it's really been based on an ex-parte order that was 
obtained by one of the parties, so I'm not willing to hold that for or against 
either party. 
Commissioner Patton further stated: 
Conspicuous by its absence are any of the professionals involved with the 
children coming before the court and having their testimony proffered on 
behalf of the mother. Instead, I have the daughter's therapist's testimony 
being proffered that he is of the opinion, based on a relationship that goes 
back several years, that the father should have temporary custody. I have Dr. 
Gentry, whose testimony which I, I understand there's a lot of allegations 
and shots being taken, and allegations being made about our other 
professional, Kaydeen, and about our guardian ad litem, but basically, I've 
got four professionals before the court, including ACAFS, that's including 
the guardian ad litem, including Dr. Coates, including Dr. Gentry, who has 
significant concerns about the mother having temporary custody. 
And I have a variety of allegations, but what I'm not convinced is, is that 
those four professionals got together and somehow formed a conspiracy to 
all make recommendations for the father. I have no reason to believe that. 
And the real concern that they all, if you narrow it all down, would appear 
to be that they are concerned about the mother's ability to provide stability 
for these children while this is pending. And I'll be honest with you. I 
probably and may very well have made a decision different than I'm going 
to make had it been one professional, that I have four professionals whose 
opinions I give a great deal of credit to and more important, I'm being told 
the mother had a bad day at ACAFS. People who go through divorce have 
bad days. That's why the court: put ACAFS in place. And I believe the 
professional involved, that the mother lacks the ability at this time to provide 
the stability for the children, and more particularly, even to leave them out 
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this court's belief that the father has prevailed upon the court in convincing 
the court that the mother lacks the ability at this time for whatever reason to 
provide that type of stability that the children nee, the court is awarding 
temporary care, custody, and control of the parties' minor children to the 
father on a temporary basis. 
. . . because I'm awarding [the father] custody, I'm awarding him possession 
of the home. 
53. The issue of temporary custody and possession of the marital home was finally heard 
by Judge Taylor on April 20, 2007. After a lengthy hearing, Judge Taylor overruled Mrs. Dahl's 
objection to Commissioner Patton's recommendation (from the December 19, 2006 hearing). 
54. From the court's "in house" docket search, the court takes judicial notice of the 
following information: the underlying divorce action was tried on the following dates before 
Judge Taylor during September through November, 2009: September 15 (pretrial motions), 22, 
29, 30; October 5, 7, 19, 20, 23. Closing arguments were heard by Judge Taylor on November 
16, 2009. Judge Taylor issued a Partial Ruling on December 8, 2009. A hearing on attorneys 
fees is schedule for February 10, 2010. Numerous motions have been filed since the last day of 
trial. 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 
As indicated in the opening paragraph of this decision, this phase of the trial was limited 
to issues concerning liability—specifically, breach and causation. The argument made and, 
ultimately, the question posed by Mr. Harrison at the conclusion of Mrs. Dahl's case was: Was 
I 
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the plaintiffs failure to present any expert testimony on the issues of the standard of care 
regarding breach and causation fatal to her claims in this legal malpractice case? 
The court agrees with both parties that Utah law generally requires expert testimony in 
legal malpractice cases. The most recent Utah case found by the court—although a medical 
malpractice case not written for official publication—is instructive. Judge James R. Taylor of 
this same district court was upheld when he ruled on summary judgment that the plaintiff had 
"failed to establish a prima facie case of causation by not designating an expert witness." Hall v. 
Steimle, 2009 UT App 224U, para. 3. Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that "[i]t is only 
in 'the most obvious cases' that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using expert 
testimony to prove causation." Id. (quoting and relying upon Fox v. Brigham Young University, 
2007 UT App 406 f 22, 176 P.3d 446 and Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 
P.3d 1015). 
The Utah appellate courts do not treat legal malpractice cases differently. "[I]n a legal 
malpractice action, expert testimony is generally required." Rogers v. Mitchell, 2003 UT App 
45U, para. 1 (citing Preston & Chambers v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 263-64 & n.3 (Utah Ct. App.l 
1997)). It is only "where the propriety of the defendant's conduct is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman" that expert testimony may not be required. Preston & 
Chambers, P.C., 943 P.2d at 263-64 (internal citations omitted). The appellate court noted in 
Preston that "[e]xpert testimony may also be required to establish the duties owed by practicing 
attorneys to their clients, especially in cases involving complex and involved allegations of 
malpractice." Id. at 263. Clearly, expert testimony will be generally required to establish both Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the standard of care and causation in medical and legal malpractice cases, especially where the 
issues presented are not within the common knowledge and experience of the layman. 
Although the parties in this case agree regarding the above-cited principles, they disagree 
regarding the characterization of the underlying divorce case as either simple or complex. If this 
malpractice case is characterized as a simple case within the common knowledge and experience 
of the layman, then no expert testimony was required and the court should grant Mr. Harrison's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Otherwise, if characterized as a complex case requiring 
expert testimony, the motion succeeds and the court should dismiss the case for Mrs. Dahl's 
failure to provide expert testimony. 
For the reasons explained below, the court finds that this is a legal malpractice case which 
required expert testimony. 
A. Was the propriety of Mr. Harrison's conduct within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layperson?4 
Mrs. Dahl argues that this is a simple case because she gave Mr. Harrison explicit 
instructions which he disobeyed by entering the Stipulation without her authority. Mrs. Dahl's 
arguments presuppose that the court agrees with her version of the facts presented at trial. 
However, the court has rejected her claim that Mr. Harrison entered into the Stipulation without 
her consent and has found that he consulted with her before the November 2 hearing and entered 
into the Stipulation with her express consent, after she had agreed to follow his advice. The 
4The court will follow Mr. Harrison's lead and use the sender-neutral term lavverson. 
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court has also found that she approved of his actions and continued to seek his full-time 
representation on the afternoon of November 2, 2006. 
Even had the court adopted Mrs. Dahl's version of the facts, expert testimony would have 
been necessary, as the propriety of Mr. Harrison's conduct was not within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layperson. 
The underlying custody case began with a 65-paragraph affidavit from Dr. Dahl which 
claimed outrageous and destructive behavior on the part of Mrs. Dahl with regard to her 
treatment of her husband and their children. The affidavit also provided information about their 
complex finances: income for Dr. Dahl, imputed income for Mrs. Dahl, business loans, other 
debts, investments, real property, and other assets. At first glance, any reader of Dr. Dahl's 
affidavit would have correctly assumed that this was going to be a hotly contested custody battle 
and that a sizable marital estate—probably in the millions of dollars—was at stake. 
Dr. Dahl's affidavit also alleged that their daughter had her own psychiatrist, that the 
daughter had threatened suicide, that Mrs. Dahl had slapped the daughter repeatedly, that Mrs. 
Dahl was administering prescription medicine to the daughter that had not been prescribed, and 
that Mrs. Dahl was increasing or changing the daughter's dosages without a doctor's order. Dr. 
Dahl's desire for custody was allegedly supported by his daughter's psychiatrist. 
Would the average layperson have easily understood the legal issues presented to Mr. 
Harrison when Mrs. Dahl appeared at his office with Dr. Dahl's affidavit and the other 
documents in her hands? The answer is clearly no. Would the average layperson have the 
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knowledge and experience to second-guess Mr. Harrison's actions in attempting to help Mrs. 
Dahl regain custody of her children. Again, the answer is clearly no. 
As demonstrated by the docket in the underlying divorce action, the hearing before 
Commissioner Patton on December 19, 2006, at which the parties proffered their evidence 
regarding temporary custody of the children, went for almost 2 Vi hours. Indeed, the defendants' 
• exhibit B indicates that the transcript for that hearing was 89 pages long. Yet, Mrs. Dahl faults 
Mr. Harrison for not attempting to do in a 15-minute-long hearing (as scheduled) after just 4 
business days of preparation (October 26, 27, 31, and November 1, 2006) what her second 
attorney, Rod Parker, attempted to do in a 2 Vi-hour hearing after more than one month's 
preparation. Even then, after one month's preparation, Mrs. Dahl's second attorney was not 
successful in obtaining custody for his client. 
The matter of temporary custody was not finally settled until the parties appeared before 
Judge Taylor on April 20, 2007. At that point in the underlying litigation, Mrs. Dahl was 
represented by Steve S. Christensen, who has also represented her in this malpractice litigation. 
At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Taylor adopted Commissioner Patton's December 19, 
2006 recommendation with regard to temporary custody and left the children in Dr. Dahl's care, 
with supervised visitation to Mrs. Dahl. Defendants' exhibit C, page 50. Mr. Christensen was 
no more successful than Mr. Harrison thought he probably would have been on November 2, 
2006. 
Further complicating the issues facing Mr. Harrison was the fact that the Fourth District 
Court had (and still has) a domestic court commissioner, Tom Patton, who heard TROs and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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temporary-order hearings for the judges and who made recommendations to the judges at the 
conclusions of those hearings.5 Could a layperson second-guess Mr. Harrison's attempts to 
prepare Mrs. Dahl for hearings before the commissioner as opposed to hearings before the judge 
assigned to the underlying divorce action? Again, the answer is no. 
Mrs. Dahl also argues that Mr. Harrison committed malpractice because he failed to 
understand and apply Rules 65 A and 101 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite her 
argument that a layperson could analyze and judge Mr. Harrison's actions in the divorce action, 
she supports this claim in her post-trial memorandum with a complex argument under those 
rules. Also, in oral argument at the conclusion of the trial, she found Mr. Harrison at fault for 
failing to recognize that Ms. Blakelock should have filed a motion for temporary orders under 
Rule 101, rather than the order to show cause which was filed. No layperson could deal 
adequately with these arguments without the aid of expert testimony. 
This court finds that the propriety of Mr. Harrison's conduct was clearly not within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layperson. The complexities of the underlying 
divorce action, its issues, the parties, and the decisions facing Mr. Harrison could not have been 
easily understood by a layperson of common knowledge and experience. The propriety of Mr. 
Harrison's actions on behalf of Mrs. Dahl could have only been understood by a layperson 
through the aid of expert testimony. Expert testimony was certainly required to establish the 
5Since the inception of the underlying divorce case, the Fourth District Court has been 
fortunate tn add a second nart-time commissioner. Josh Faulkner. 
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duties owed by Mr. Harrison to Mrs. Dahl, whether Mr. Harrison breached those duties, and 
whether he caused any damage to Mrs. Dahl. 
B. Does it make any difference that this case was tried to the bench? 
Obviously, a trial court judge is not a layperson. So, does it make any difference in the 
court's analysis that this malpractice case was tried to the bench, rather than to a jury? This court 
finds that it does not. 
Although Utah case law does not address this point directly, it is clear from a reading of 
the above-mentioned cases that the Utah appellate courts do not make a distinction between the 
trial court and a jury when considering the necessity of expert witnesses in legal or medical 
malpractice cases. 
For instance, in Hall v. Steimle, Judge Taylor's decision on summary judgment-was 
affirmed, when he dismissed the plaintiffs case for failure to designate an expert witness. Id. 
This was a case that was not decided by a jury, because the trial court dismissed it as a result of a 
successful summary j udgment motion. 
The issue of expert testimony also came before the trial court (Judge Fred Howard of the 
Fourth District Court) in Fox v. Brigham Young University in a motion in limine, which the court 
converted to a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. Id at P10. The motion was argued before the 
scheduled bench trial began. Id at P8. In that case, Judge Howard dismissed the plaintiffs' 
negligence and loss of consortium claims for their failure to present (or plan to present) expert 
testimony at the bench trial. Id. at P23. 
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The trial court's decision denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was also 
affirmed in Rogers v. Mitchell because of their failure to provide expert testimony as to the 
appropriate standard of care. Id. Lastly, in Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, the trial court's 
dismissal of the defendant's counterclaims upon the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
was upheld, due to the defendant's failure to designate an expert witness to establish the 
attorney's standard of care. Id. at 260. 
In all of the above-listed cases, the expert testimony issue was decided before trial by the 
trial court, regardless of any future intention by the parties to try the case to a jury. Although 
neither the parties nor the court were able to find any Utah cases which directly answer the above 
question regarding bench vs. jury trials, the court finds that the case cited by Mr. Harrison is very 
helpful. In Lentino v. Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the question and concluded that the identity of 
the fact finder makes no difference. "We conclude, however, that the better approach is to apply 
the same requirement to both bench and jury trials." Id. at 481. 
After applying the exact same legal standard as is applied in Utah—the general 
requirement of expert testimony and the "simple case" exception, the Lentino court reasoned: 
First, although the judge may be competent to evaluate defendant's 
conduct in light of the relevant standard of care, the actual standard 
of care itself is a question of fact that is best left to the presentation 
of evidence with the opportunity for cross-examination and rebuttal. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Second, we do not believe that a practicable standard exists which 
takes into account the trial judge's knowledge. Such a subjective 
standard, which would allow the trial judge to use his own knowledge 
if he were familiar with the appropriate standard of conduct, would 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
effectively change a question of factfinding into one of discretion and 
require appellate courts to undertake the unwanted task of evaluating 
the trial judge's personal knowledge. (Footnote omitted.) 
Finally, in the interest of uniformity, we prefer not to unnecessarily 
establish a different substantive requirement for bench trials than for 
jury trials. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge was correct in holding 
that expert testimony is required in bench trials of legal malpractice 
claims except where the matter under investigation is so simple, and 
the lack of skill so obvious, as to be within the range of the ordinary 
experience and comprehension of even non-professional persons. 
Id. 
This court finds the Lentino court's reasoning persuasive—and quite comforting. Simply 
put, this court is not interested in stepping into the shoes of expert witnesses in an effort to 
determine facts without the opportunity for cross-examination and rebuttal, nor is this court 
desirous of using its own subjective experience to determine the appropriate standard of care in a 
complex legal malpractice case. This court agrees with Mr. Harrison that it would be improper 
and dangerous for counsel or Utah's appellate courts to scrutinize a judge's background, 
experience, and laiowledge to determine whether a judge could set the appropriate standard of 
care. Finally, this court agrees with the Lentino court that there is no reason to establish a 
different substantive requirement for bench trials than for jury trials. 
Therefore, there should be no difference in the requirement of expert testimony in a bench 
trial as opposed to a jury trial. It makes no difference in the end that this case was tried to the 
bench; Mrs. Dahl should have provided expert testimony to establish the standard of care and 
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II. The Three Causes of Action 
So, in the end, was the plaintiffs failure to present any expert testimony on the issues of 
the standard of care regarding breach and causation fatal to her claims in this legal malpractice 
case? The court finds that Mrs. Dahl's failure to present any expert testimony was, indeed, fatal 
to her claims in this legal malpractice case. 
Mrs. Dahl asserted three causes of action in relation to her representation by Mr. 
Harrison: (1) negligence, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) breach of contract. Negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty as causes of action in a legal malpractice case are closely related, 
diverging only at the element of duty. "An action for breach of a promise is governed by rules of 
contract rather than rules of legal malpractice." Bennet v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 18 (Utah 2003) (quoting, Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffery M. Smith, Legal 
Malpractice § 8.5, at 590 (4th ed. 1996)). 
A. Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
To prevail on her causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Mrs. Dahl 
must show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) a duty arising from that 
relationship, (3) breach of that duty, (4) a causal connection between the breach and the harm 
suffered, and (5) actual damages. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). 
There is no argument between the parties that an attorney-client relationship existed 
between Mrs. Dahl and Mr. Harrison. However, Mrs. Dahl failed to present any expert testimony 
as to the duty or standard of care that arose from that attorney-client relationship. Without expert 
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testimony as to the standard of care, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the court to determine 
whether Mr. Harrison breached his duty to Mrs. Dahl. 
Nevertheless, the court's Findings of Fact clearly demonstrate that Mr. Harrison spoke 
with Mrs. Dahl before the hearing about his intention to seek a continuance and to enter into a 
stipulation regarding temporary custody and temporary possession of the marital home. Before 
he entered into the Stipulation on November 2, 2006, he spoke with Mrs. Dahl about its 
provisions and then acted with her approval. He spoke with her after the hearing, informed her 
as to what had happened, went over all of the paragraphs of the Stipulation, instructed her to 
leave the marital home, and, again, received her approval of his actions. She then came to his 
office and dictated a note to the office receptionist, again asking him to take her case on a full-
time basis, which further indicated her approval of his actions on her behalf. 
Without expert testimony as to causation, Mrs. Dahl's causes of action for negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty also fail. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff, Mrs. Dahl, has 
failed to carry her burden of proof as to three of the four elements of these two causes of action 
which were tried in this first part of the bifurcated trial. The court grants judgment to the 
defendants on these two causes of action. 
B. Breach of Contract 
To prevail on her breach of contract claim, Mrs. Dahl must show: (1) the existence of a 
valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by Mrs. Dahl; (3)breach of an express promise 
by Mr. Harrison, and (4) damages to Mrs. Dahl resulting from the breach. Bennett v. Jones, 
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Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 p.3d 17, 26 (Utah 2003) (quoting Ronald E. Mallen & 
Jeffrey M Smith, Legal Malpractice § 8.5, at 590 (4th ed. 1996)). 
In all respects, it appears to the court that this cause of action was thrown away by the 
plaintiff. Mrs. Dahl's pretrial brief does not address this cause of action, nor does the post-trial 
brief. All arguments at the conclusion of the trial centered upon the first two causes. The court 
finds it impossible to find any facts that establish the elements of breach of contract in this 
matter. 
Although Mr. Harrison testified that Mrs. Dahl signed a retainer agreement, no such 
agreement was produced during discovery or at trial. The court has nothing before it which 
U^ 
Vocx*'* 
would explain what the terms of any contract—written or oral—between the parties was. The 
court finds that Mrs. Dahl provided no proof at trial as to what the contract's provisions were—if 
an actual contract existed. 
Mrs. Dahl clearly performed to some extent by paying Mr. Harrison his initial retainer fee 
of $5,000, plus another $7,000. However, the court finds no evidence that Mr. Harrison breached 
an express promise to Mrs. Dahl or that such a breach of an express promise caused any damage 
to Mrs. Dahl. If there were damages, that element was reserved for the second portion of this 
bifurcated trial. 
Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff, Mrs. Dahl, has failed to carry her burden of 
proof as to two of the three elements of this cause of action which were tried in this first part of 
the bifurcated trial. The court grants judgment to the defendants on breach of contract cause of 
action. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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III. Conclusion 
The court grants judgment to the defendants on all three causes of action, thereby 
dismissing this action in favor of the defendants. The court orders the attorney for the defendants 
to prepare conclusions of law and an order of dismissal consistent with this decision. 
Dated the 6th day of January, 2010. 
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Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Memorandum Opinion dated January 6, 
2010,/as well as all evidence presented at trial of this matter on October 26-27, 2009, the Court 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Plaintiffs first claim for relief, legal malpractice based upon negligence, requires 
proof of five elements: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client 
arising from their relationship; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) a causal connection between the 
breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (5) actual damages. Christensen & 
Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ^ 22, 194 P.3d 931. 
2. The parties do not dispute the existence of an attorney-client relationship, so that 
element is deemed to be satisfied. 
3. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the "duty" element of her negligence-based claim 
because she failed to present expert testimony at trial to define the scope of the duty under the 
circumstances of this case. See Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); Rogers v. Mitchell, 2003 UT App 45, 2003 WL 21295215, at *1 (unreported). 
4. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the "breach" element of her negligence-based claim 
because she failed to present expert testimony at trial to demonstrate that any duty had been 
breached. See Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d at 264; Rogers, 2003 UT App 45, 2003 WL 
21295215, at *1. 
5. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "breach" element of her negligence-based 
claim because she approved the material terms of the Stipulation. (See January 6, 2010 Findings 
of Fact and Memorandum Opinion at 31.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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claim because she failed to present expert testimony at trial to demonstrate that any she suffered 
any injury caused by a breach of a standard of care. See Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d at 264; 
Rogers, 2003 UT App45, 2003 WL 21295215, at *1. 
7. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her negligence-based 
claim because she failed to present any evidence that she would have benefited but for the 
Stipulation. See Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1978). 
8. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her negligence-based 
claim because she failed to present any evidence that any injury she suffered would have been the 
foreseeable result of the Stipulation. See Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 
(Utah 1993). 
9. The Court makes no finding on the final element of her negligence-based claim 
because damages had been reserved for a second phase of trial, which is now unnecessary. 
10. Plaintiffs second claim for relief, breach of fiduciary duty in the context of an 
attorney-client relationship, requires proof of the following four elements: (1) an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client; (3) causation, both actual 
and proximate; and (4) damages suffered by the client. Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64, \ 23. 
11. The parties do not dispute the existence of an attorney-client relationship, so that 
element is deemed to be satisfied. 
12. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second element of her fiduciary-duty-based claim 
because she failed to present expert testimony at trial to define the scope of the fiduciary duty 
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Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d at 264; Rogers, 2003 UT App 45, 2003 WL 21295215, at *1. 
13. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy second element of her fiduciary-duty-based 
claim because she approved the material terms of the Stipulation. (See January 6, 2010 Findings 
of Fact and Memorandum Opinion at 31.) 
14. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her fiduciary-duty-based 
claim because she failed to present expert testimony at trial to demonstrate that any she suffered 
any injury caused by a breach of a standard of care. See Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d at 264; 
Rogers, 2003 UT App 45, 2003 WL 21295215, at *1. 
15. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her fiduciary-duty-
based claim because she failed to present any evidence that she would have benefited but for the 
Stipulation. See Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896. 
16. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her fiduciary-duty-
based claim because she failed to present any evidence that any injury she suffered was the 
foreseeable result of the Stipulation. See Steffensen, 862 P.2d at 1346. 
17. The Court makes no finding on existence of damages under her fiduciary-duty-
based claim because damages had been reserved for a second phase of trial, which is now 
unnecessary. 
18. Plaintiffs third claim for relief, breach of contract, requires proof of the following 
four elements: (1) a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of 
the express promise by the defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 
Christensen & Jensen, 2008 UT 64, If 24. 
19. Given the absence of evidence submitted bv Plaintiff on the contract-based claim. 
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the Court deems it impossible to find in her favor on any of the elements. {See January 6, 2010 
Findings of Fact and Memorandum Opinion at 32.) 
20. Specifically, while the parties do not dispute the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship, there was little, if any, evidence presented as to what the express terms of the 
contract were, assuming a contract existed. (See id.) 
21. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the "breach" element of her contract-based claim 
because she failed to present evidence of express contract terms and failed to present expert 
testimony at trial to define the scope of the duties allegedly breached by Defendants under any 
contract that may have existed. See Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d at 264; Rogers, 2003 UT 
App 45, 2003 WL 21295215, at *1. 
22. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "breach" element of her contract-based claim 
because she approved the material terms of the Stipulation. (See January 6, 2010 Findings of 
Fact and Memorandum Opinion at 31.) 
l£r.—--Plaintiff Iras failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her contract-based claim-
be.can.se she failed to present export tcstimeny at trial to demonstrate that any 3hc suffered any 
injiiryxausod by the breach of an express contract term. Sec Preston & Chambers, 943 P.2d«at 
264j4legers9 2003 UT-^pp 45, 2003 WL 21295215, at + 1: 
24. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her contract-based 
claim because she failed to present any evidence that she would have benefited but for the 
Stipulation. See Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896. 
25. Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy the "causation" element of her contract-based 
daim because she failed to nresent anv evidence that any damages she suffered would have been 
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the foreseeable result of the Stipulation, See Steffensen, 862 P.2d at 1346. 
26. The Court makes no finding on existence of damages under her contract-based 
claim because damages had been reserved for a second phase of trial, which is now unnecessary. 
27. Plaintiffs fourth claim for relief is for punitive damages. Utah law allows 
punitive damages to "be awarded only if... it is established by clear and convincing evidence that 
the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a) (2008). 
28. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate liability on any of the previous claims, which is 
fatal to her claim for punitive damages. 
On the basis of the foregoing conclusions and previously-entered Findings of Fact, it is 
hereby ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. 
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were to be exchanged by the parties by November 19, 2007 and 
my memory of the rules is, once the initial disclosures are 
exchanged, you can start your discovery. The discovery on 
Page 2 as outlined, 2(a) is that fact discovery shall be 
completed no later than April 7, 2008. And I emphasize the 
words *fact discovery shall be completed'. It's not fact 
discovery shall be sent out. It is fact discovery shall be 
completed and I believe that's the language that's actually 
used in the rule which contemplates you send it out early 
enough that you get your answers back and if you're doing 
interrogatories or requests for production, that you get the 
response and then you can get your depositions done whenever 
during that time period. But my experience in this court is 
that everyone treats this as a completion date. It's written 
as a completion date, not as a NNwe shall send it out by this 
date" and that's the way I read this here, that fact 
discovery shall be completed by no later than November 7, 
2008. 
B, talks about expert discovery. There's some 
overlapping here. Well, in a sense because in order to know 
who your expert witnesses were going to be, you would have to 
be working on that during the fact discovery time period but 
the designation of expert witnesses was due for the plaintiff 
on May 5th and for the defendant on June 2nd, with rebuttal 
reports due by June 16 and the deadlines to depose all 
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So, for those rules - I'm sorry, for those reasons 
I find that the plaintiff has been dilatory, that the request 
is not founded in fact or in reason and that there is no good 
cause for the Court to grant the 56F motion. So I deny that 
motion for those reasons. 
As to the protective order, the argument of the 
plaintiff is that it's unfair for the defendant to say that 
they can't or don't want to answer the discovery that was 
propounded by the plaintiff on the last day of the time 
period because they certainly could if they wanted to answer 
the interrogatories. I don't think that's the issue and I 
don't think that's what the rules contemplate. The bottom 
line is that the defendants are the ones who are standing 
here at this point with clean hands as to this argument. 
They did their discovery, they did it timely, they completed 
it within the time period. It wasn't their job to make the 
other side do the work that needed to be done. It wasn't 
their job to remind the plaintiff that she had discovery she 
might want to do and the time element was put in place by the 
parties and I think that they have a right to expect, the 
defendants have a right to expect the plaintiff to work 
within that time frame. 
They are prejudiced. This is a matter that has 
been filed by the plaintiff. This is a matter that should 
keep moving regardless of what's happening on the other case 
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indicated the part that raises the issue. I think it is not 
prejudicial to the other party to conduct an expert 
deposition at this point when we haven't even had a pretrial 
in this matter but I think the important point is these 
dispositive motions have been pending before the Court. It 
seems like it would be an unusual thing to require the 
parties to continue to assume that that motion was not 
pending. I mean, I can see an argument that that would just 
be overly litigious and wasting the party's resources without 
knowing which direction the Court is going to go. It seems 
as far as the expert discovery goes, it is a very reasonable 
interpretation by the Court to allow an extension of those 
portions that had not expired when the motions were filed, 
when the motion for summary judgment was filed. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No. 
THE COURT: Solely on the basis that the request 
was to extend all deadlines by 30 days, I'm sorry, by three 
months? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Three months. 
THE COURT: And because I think there might have 
been an implication there that this had to be decided before 
the parties would have to designate, I'm going to grant in a 
partial manner the request to amend the scheduling order. 
I'm going to move - I've got to get the right page here - the 
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designation of expert witnesses to 30 days from today. Today 
is August 7, so that would be September 7 for the plaintiff. 
I need a calendar. 
Sorry. I don't have everything at my fingertips 
like I do downstairs. August 7 would be Thursday the 7th -
I'm sorry, today and I just wanted to see what September 7 
was going to be. That's a Sunday. Okay. Let's make it by 
Monday, September 8, plaintiff will designate its expert 
witnesses and you did it approximately a month later on this 
one so let me find a weekday, October 6 would be the deadline 
for defendant's designation of expert witnesses and then you 
went two weeks, so rebuttal reports from both parties would 
be due Monday, October 20th and then you went a month to 
depose all experts. So let's look for about November 20, 
Monday, November 7th would be the deadline to depose all 
experts. And previously yau had the cutoff for dispositive 
or potentially dispositive motions for April 28. I don't see 
any reason to change that and I would ask you to request a 
pretrial conference as soon as your discovery is complete. 
Okay? 
And so Mr. Lieberman, I'll ask you to prepare the 
amended scheduling order. 
MR. LIEBERMAN: Sure, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, we're running out of time here 
folks. Let's deal with the Motion to Strike and the Motion 
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Your Honor, I do believe that we have a duty to 
supplement. I do believe he's entitled to that information 
and I represent to this Court that we're going to do that 
diligently, that we have continued to do it even though he 
would not agree with us to do it. 
THE COURT: Well, it's now December, it's now mid-
December. What have you got for him this far? Apparently 
one. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Got one but I'm trying to - I've 
talked at length with the other two experts that need to 
submit supplements. If I could have until the first Monday 
in January I will have supplements for the other two experts 
to him and so I request the Court to allow us to do that. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't believe that a sanction 
is available because there's been no allegation of bad faith 
and that's required under 37F as well. 
And finally, even though I think Christensen/Jewkes 
is a case, an extreme, we're not arguing that the Court 
should wait until five days before trial and let us 
supplement all that time. It stands for the proposition that 
if there is time for them to get the information in order to 
prepare for trial, then there's not prejudice and if we can 
have until the first Monday in January, there's no way they 
could be prejudiced because they will have time to get the 
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and also addresses the medical experts, "lastly, the 
disclosures related to the medical experts are likewise 
inadequate." He notes in the last paragraph that there is a 
tight window of time and there was. I was trying to get this 
case moving and so he requested that within the next two days 
that plaintiff would provide complete expert reports and then 
the last paragraph, the last sentence is "Please consider 
this our attempt to meet and confer on this matter prior to 
any motion practice." And when he doesn't hear back from 
them by Friday at 5:00, he files the motion, sends off the 
motion. 
It's not as clean as an affidavit would have been 
but it's included with the motion and I'm persuaded that by 
letter, he did attempt to give notice and to get compliance 
with the rule. I'm also persuaded that the fact that I must 
consider the fact that I gave the plaintiff four more months 
to take care of this problem and this issue of discovery with 
regard to the experts and what happened at the end was last 
minute and poorly done and that the four months I allowed so 
that the reports could be done and the experts could be on 
board, amounted to nothing because obviously this was all 
done at the last minute. 
The suggestion of the plaintiff is that I give him 
until the beginning of January and then that will kick 
everything back as pointed out by Mr. Lieberman and by the 
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time we get done, we're going to back right where we were a 
year previous. 
In all honesty, I thought I was overly kind in 
granting the motion when we met in July. This is a case that 
has now been going for v/ell over a year - well, I can't tell 
you when the complaint was filed because I've only got the 
second file and I did notice that in the printout of the 
docket that was included on the other motion that the related 
case is moving along. There are things being filed 
repeatedly. Maybe not repeatedly, not that they're being 
repeated in their filings but all kinds of matters are being 
filed, all kinds of hearings are being held at the same time 
that nothing is happening on the discovery for the plaintiffs 
in this case as to their experts. That's not my problem. 
This case is my problem. I mean, what I'm saying is, if the 
plaintiff is too busy with the other case, that's not 
something I can deal with. Plaintiff chose to file this case 
and we're going to keep it moving. 
So as far as substantial compliance, I find there 
was substantial compliance with the meet and confer rule. I 
find that at this point in this litigation for the plaintiff 
to now in December, have finally filed what the parties are 
calling a supplement to expert reports that were due on 
September 8, that's not satisfactory and I don't find that 
the defendant in this matter should have to wait until after 
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the first of the year to finally get what should have been 
filed on September 8 in a timely manner after the Court gave 
the plaintiff four more months to do what the Court now wants 
to have - or what the plaintiff now wants to have 
accomplished by the first of the year. So, for those reasons 
I'm going to grant the motion. 
As to attorney's fees, I don't find it's 
appropriate under the rules to surprise Mr. Christensen with 
a request for attorney's fees at this state and so I'm going 
to deny the request for attorney's fees. 
And as to prejudice or harm to the defendant, I do 
base my decision in this matter on the fact that the 
defendant is harmed. I find that there is a willful failure 
on the plaintiff to carry this case forward and to obey the 
orders of the court, with the Court having given the 
plaintiff more time over the objection of the defendant. 
But, I find that a request for attorney's fees at this point 
based on bad faith is ill timed and lately timed and I'm not 
going to take an additional motion on it. That was the 
choice that the defendant made in filing the motion. 
Okay, I have another haring at 10:30 that's 
starting in five minutes if the gentleman shows up but let's 
move on quickly. If he comes, all we're doing is taking his 
agreement on a divorce and we may break. I have a meeting at 
noon that I have to be at. So let's move to the other issue 
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That's all I have. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
I think this is a Motion for Reconsideration which 
motions are frowned upon by the Supreme Court. I think it 
Justice Nehring that said that the proliferation of these 
motions was like the proliferation of cheat grass or 
something like that. Although this is not a second motion 
for the plaintiff, it is the second go round on the very same 
issue. His responses to the defendant's motion to strike his 
expert witness reports are the same as his responses here. 
As I look at Rule 37F, it says, "Failure to 
disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document 
or other material as required by Rule 26A" which is exactly 
what I found at our previous hearing, "or to amend the prior 
response" which doesn't apply here, "that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document, or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose." I found 
neither of those. I did not find that the failure to 
disclose was harmless and I did not find that the plaintiff 
showed good cause for the failure to disclose. 
The only wiggle room that's allowed under this rule 
is the next sentence, "In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the Court may order any other sanction including 
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payment of reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Any order 
permitted under subpart B(2a, b or c, and informing the jury 
of the failure to disclose." None of that was requested by 
the plaintiff at the time we heard the other motion. I don't 
think that I have to take the extra step that he wants me to 
take when the rule is so clear that the parties shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document, or other material at 
any hearing. I made the appropriate findings. I made it 
very clear that I thought and found, not just thought, that I 
found that the plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 
26A(3)(b) and (c) and my memory is I read through all of that 
as Mr. Lieberman claimed and then I went over to 37F and I 
read through that and I made all the findings and made it 
very clear that I was striking the expert reports which meant 
without the expert reports, there wouldn't be anything to do 
with experts. 
So, I deny the Plaintiff's Motion to Allow 
Testimony by her expert witnesses and I grant the Defendant's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs finding that this was a 
frivolous motion, that it should not have been filed and at 
the very least I gave the attorney for plaintiff a very 
strong hint at a previous hearing that this was a surprise to 
me and that I didn't think it was a valid motion when he 
mentioned that he was filing it. 
So I adopt the reasoning found in Mr. Lieberman's 
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1 response to the motion and I adopt the reasoning found in his 
2 motion for attorney's fees and costs, for the cost of his 
3 client in having to respond to this motion from the 
4 plaintiff. 
5 All right. So, that takes care of those motions 
6 and that leaves us with the Certificate of Readiness for 
7 trial. As far as I'm concerned, counsel, discovery is 
f 8 closed, the issue of experts is closed. Is there anything 
9 else in your opinion, Mr. Christensen, that needs to be done 
10 before I set this matter for trial? 
I 11 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Same question for you, Mr. Lieberman. 
13 MR. LIEBERMAN: No, Your Honor, we're ready. 
I 14 THE COURT: Okay, how long is it going to take to 
I 15 try this case? 
I 16 MR. LIEBERMAN: From our prospective, Your Honor, 
17 for our portion of the case I anticipate a day and half of 
§18 testimony and cross. 
19 THE COURT: From your side. 
120 Okay. Mr. Christensen? 
21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We anticipate approximately nine 
22 days, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Why? 
;24 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Because -
[25 THE COURT: Tell me who your witnesses are going to 
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